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AIA PROCEEDINGS: A PRESCRIPTION FOR
ACCELERATING THE AVAILABILITY OF GENERIC DRUGS
ABSTRACT
The Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984 increases patient access to lower-cost
generic drugs by incentivizing generic manufacturers to challenge the patents
covering successful drug products. The Hatch-Waxman framework creates an
automatic stay that blocks the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) from
approving a new generic drug for thirty months. The purpose of the thirtymonth stay is to provide time for any patent infringement claims to be litigated
before the new generic drug is permitted onto the market. The stay may be
terminated before the end of the thirty-month period if the generic
manufacturer prevails in invalidating the patents blocking generic market
entry.
More recently, the America Invents Act (AIA) of 2011 created new
administrative proceedings at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
that replace certain aspects of district court patent litigation. Generic
manufacturers are using these administrative proceedings to challenge the
validity of drug patents in hopes of expediting the FDA’s approval of their new
generic drugs. This practice raises some unanticipated questions. Should the
USPTO invalidate the relevant drug patents before the related district court
litigation is finalized, a question arises as to the effect of that USPTO decision
on the thirty-month stay of FDA approval. It is unclear whether the FDA
should immediately approve the generic drug for market entry or whether the
thirty-month stay should continue after the USPTO’s decision of
unpatentability.
This Comment examines the relevant statutory provisions of the HatchWaxman Act and AIA and explores the scenarios that give rise to uncertainty
about the thirty-month stay. It argues that the thirty-month stay should
terminate when the Federal Circuit affirms the USPTO’s unpatentability
determination and issues the formal mandate. Because neither the FDA nor
courts are likely to construe the relevant statutory provisions to this effect, this
Comment proposes an amendment to incorporate AIA proceedings into the
Hatch-Watchman framework.
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INTRODUCTION
The legal framework governing the generic drug industry involves a
delicate balance between two opposing policy interests.1 First, it seeks to
increase the availability of generic drugs.2 This benefits society by reducing
the financial strain caused by illness, promoting patient adherence to
medication regimes, and reducing government spending on medical care.3 On
the other hand, the legal framework incentivizes the development of new,
pioneer drugs.4 Pioneer drug developers spend significant upfront expenses on
developing and winning administrative approval—around $2.87 billion and
twelve years for each new drug—and need a period of marketing exclusivity to
recoup the expenses.5 In 1984, Congress attempted to balance these opposing
policy interests in the Hatch-Waxman Act.6
1 Generic drugs are copies of pioneer drugs that “enter the market at a lower price” once the patents
covering the pioneer drugs expire. Joanna Shepherd, Disrupting the Balance: The Conflict Between HatchWaxman and Inter Partes Review, N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 14, 22 (2016). A “generic” could be
either a generic version of a small-molecule drug or a generic version of a biologic medicine. Small-molecule
drugs “are created by purely chemical processes and have relatively simple structures”; they “comprise the
majority of commonly used drugs.” Ryan Timmis, Comment, The Biologics Price Competition and Innovation
Act: Potential Problems in the Biologic-Drug Regulatory Scheme, 13 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 215, 217
(2015). Biologic medicines are manufactured from living cells through biological processes and have a more
complex structure than small-molecule drugs. JOHN R. THOMAS, PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT LAW 772–73 (2d
ed. 2010). This Comment exclusively addresses generic small-molecule drugs, which are regulated through a
different pathway than generic biologic medicines. Id. at 26 (discussing the Biologics Price Competition and
Innovation Act (2010)).
2 See, e.g., Actavis Elizabeth LLC v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 625 F.3d 760, 765 (D.C. Cir. 2010);
Novo Nordisk A/S v. Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd., 601 F.3d 1359, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (Clevenger, J.,
concurring), rev’d, 566 U.S. 399 (2012).
3 Aaron S. Kesselheim & Jonathan J. Darrow, Hatch-Waxman Turns 30: Do We Need a Re-Designed
Approach for the Modern Era?, 15 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 293, 315–17 (2015) (explaining that
high drug costs contribute to medication non-adherence among patients with limited income).
4 See, e.g, Actavis, 625 F.3d at 761; Novo Nordisk, 601 F.3d at 136. The pioneer drug is the new drug on
the market. See Novo Nordisk, 601 F.3d at 1360.
5 Brian T. Apel, Note, An Administrative Meter Maid: Using Inter Partes Review and Post-Grant
Review to Curb Exclusivity Parking via the “Failure to Market” Provision of the Hatch-Waxman Act, 114
MICH. L. REV. 107, 108 (2015); Jennifer E. Sturiale, The Hatch-Waxman Act, Post-Grant Review, and the
PTAB: A New Sort of Competition 15 (Sept. 14, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2824764 (on file with the author) (“[T]he total capitalized research and
development costs per approved drug, including the cost of failed drugs and post-approval research and
development spending, is about $2.87 billion in 2013 dollars.”). The cost of new drug development is deeply
contested, and one study has estimated the cost at as low as $130 million to $195 million adjusted for the risk
of failure. U.N. Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Access to Medicines, Promoting Innovation and
Access to Health Technologies, at 35 (Sept. 14, 2016), http://www.unsgaccessmeds.org/final-report/.
6 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585
(1984) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2012)); see, e.g., Novo Nordisk, 601 F.3d at 1360; Actavis,
625 F.3d at 765 (“The Hatch-Waxman Amendments ‘struck a balance between expediting generic drug
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The Hatch-Waxman Act creates a complex patent litigation scheme that
allows generic manufacturers to win earlier market entry by showing that the
patents blocking generic entry are invalid or not infringed.7 Faster market entry
creates competition in the drug market, which ultimately will reduce prices for
patients.8 The patent litigation scheme provides a stay of thirty months to allow
the pioneer drug developer to assert its patent rights before generic market
entry.9 This stay is important because its end marks the earliest date that a
proposed generic drug can be approved by the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) and become available to the American public, with some exceptions.10
Generic sponsors strive to prevail early in the patent litigation to lift the stay
before the end of the thirty-month period.11 Until recently, these patent
disputes were litigated in the only available forum: Article III courts.
With the America Invents Act (AIA) in 2011, Congress introduced new
administrative proceedings at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
that effectively replace certain aspects of district court litigation.12 Generic
sponsors have been using the AIA proceedings to attack the drug patents
blocking generic entry in hopes of expediting FDA approval and market
entry.13 This practice raises unanswered questions about the Hatch-Waxman
statutory scheme.

applications and protecting the interests of the original drug manufacturers.’” (quoting Abbott Labs v. Young,
920 F.2d 984, 985 (D.C. Cir. 1990)).
7 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii) (2012). Patent validity is “determined on a claim-by-claim basis”;
however, the “Hatch-Waxman Act speaks in terms of a ‘patent’ being found invalid, not a ‘patent claim.’”
Sturiale, supra note 5, at 7 n.28. For simplicity’s sake, this Comment will speak in terms of “patent,” rather
than “claim,” validity.
8 See Sturiale, supra note 5, at 38.
9 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii); Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Sebelius, 856 F. Supp. 2d 196, 201 (D.D.C. 2012).
10 See. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii), (j)(5)(B)(iii); Mylan, 856 F. Supp. 2d at 201.
11 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(C)(i), (j)(5)(B)(iii)(I).
12 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified at 35 U.S.C.
§§ 1–375). In pursuit of the AIA’s goal to “limit unnecessary and counterproductive litigation costs,” the
USPTO sought “to create a timely, cost-effective alternative to [district court] litigation” in crafting the inter
partes review regulations. Changes to Implement Inter Partes Review Proceedings, Post-Grant Review
Proceedings, and Transitional Program for Covered Business Method Patents, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,680 (Aug. 14,
2012) (codified at 37 C.F.R. § 42); see also Universal Elecs., Inc. v. Universal Remote Control, Inc., 943 F.
Supp. 2d 1028, 1029 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (“The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act . . . intended to improve the
former inter partes reexamination proceeding with a new inter partes review proceeding.”).
13 Arlene Chow & Ernest Yakob, Novel AIA Adversarial Procedures for Challenging Validity of
Pharmaceutical Patents, 21 WESTLAW J. INTELL. PROP., Feb. 4, 2015, at 3, 5; see also 35 U.S.C. §§ 311(b),
321(b) (2012) (“A petitioner in a post-grant review may request to cancel as unpatentable 1 or more claims of
a patent . . . .”).
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This Comment addresses a question the AIA did not answer: Can the
USPTO’s finding of unpatentability in an AIA proceeding terminate the stay of
FDA approval before the end of the thirty-month period? The courts and
agencies have yet to address this question.14
This Comment, proceeding in five parts, proposes that the thirty-month
stay should terminate when the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
affirms the USPTO’s unpatentability determination. This proposal furthers the
policy goals of the Hatch-Waxman Act and AIA, increases patient access to
generic drugs, and protects the innovator’s patent rights. Parts I and II examine
the relevant provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act and the AIA. Part III
establishes that a Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) decision affirmed on
appeal can occur before the end of the thirty-month period. In those
circumstances, however, the relevant statutory provisions do not permit
termination of the thirty-month stay, as shown in Part IV. Part V proposes an
amendment to incorporate the AIA proceedings into the Hatch-Waxman Act’s
thirty-month stay framework.
I. THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT
The Hatch-Waxman Act governs the FDA’s approval of generic drugs and
sets out a complex procedural scheme for challenging the patents blocking
generic market entry. Section A describes the FDA’s approval process for
generic drugs. Section B examines the procedural scheme for resolving the
underlying patent disputes.
A. The Regulatory Approval Process for Generic Drugs and Extensions of
Exclusivity for Pioneer Drugs
Before 1984, 65% of drugs with expired patents lacked a generic
alternative.15 As a result of this void, pioneer drug developers could charge

14

See, e.g., Sturiale, supra note 5, at 42–43.
THOMAS, supra note 1, at 10–12 (stating that before the Hatch-Waxman Act, a patentee could preserve
its market exclusivity beyond the patent term because a generic manufacturer could not commence seeking
FDA approval until the appropriate patents had expired); David M. Dudzinski, Reflections on Historical,
Scientific, and Legal Issues Relevant to Designing Approval Pathways for Generic Versions of Recombinant
Protein-Based Therapeutics and Monoclonal Antibodies, 60 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 143, 168–69 (2005) (stating
that before the Hatch-Waxman Act, approximately 150 brand-name drugs lacked a generic alternative);
Jonathan M. Lave, Responding to Patent Litigation Settlements: Does the FTC Have It Right Yet?, 64 U. PITT.
L. REV. 201, 202 (2002) (discussing that nearly 100% of the top-selling drugs with expired patents have
generic versions available today, versus only 35% in 1983).
15
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high prices beyond the drug’s patent term.16 Congress responded to this need
for generic competition by enacting the Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984, which
spawned a transformation in the American pharmaceutical industry.17 Between
1984 and 2015, the market share of generic drugs has increased from merely
19% of drugs dispensed to 89%.18 The Hatch-Waxman Act is designed to
balance two competing policy interests—expanding the availability of generic
drugs while encouraging the innovation of pioneer drugs.19
The Hatch-Waxman Act reduces the barriers to generic market entry by
creating the Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA).20 Prior to the
ANDA, generic sponsors were required to submit their own clinical data to the
FDA, forcing them to duplicate the clinical investigations already performed
by pioneer-drug developers.21 For pioneer drugs, these clinical investigations
are required to prove that they are “sufficiently safe and effective” to be
marketed to the public.22 But for generic drugs, clinical investigations are
needlessly costly and time-consuming because generic drugs are chemically
identical to approved drugs that have already undergone years of clinical
investigations.23 These investigations account for over 90% of pioneer research
and development spending and years of study, in part because they include
human test subjects.24 The ANDA allows the generic sponsor to shortcut the
burden of conducting its own clinical investigations, enabling it to bring “drugs
to market at a small fraction of the cost of” new pioneer drugs.25 The ANDA
16

Apel, supra note 5, at 111.
Shepherd, supra note 1, at 17–18.
18 Id. (“The generic industry exploded after the [Hatch-Waxman Act]” and “was assisted by drug
substitution laws in every state that allow, or sometimes require, pharmacists to automatically substitute a
generic equivalent drug when a patient presents a prescription for a brand drug”).
19 See, e.g., Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Forest Labs., Inc., 527 F.3d 1278, 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2008);
Biotechnology Indus. Org. v. District of Columbia, 505 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
20 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2012); Caraco, 527 F.3d at 1282; Ranbaxy Labs., Ltd. v. Leavitt, 459 F. Supp.
2d 1, 2 (D.D.C.), aff’d, 469 F.3d 120 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
21 THOMAS, supra note 1, at 14–15; Shepherd, supra note 1, at 23. While many generic manufacturers
had to perform clinical investigations, some could rely on published scientific literature demonstrating the
safety and efficacy of the brand-name drug. However, this kind of literature was not available for all drugs. Id.
The clinical investigation data were oftentimes protected as trade secrets. Henry G. Grabowski et al., Evolving
Brand-Name and Generic Drug Competition May Warrant a Revision of the Hatch-Waxman Act, 30 HEALTH
AFF. 2157, 2157 (2011).
22 THOMAS, supra note 1, at 7. Clinical investigations occur over several stages, involving the testing of
the new drug in hundreds or thousands of patients. Id. at 7–8.
23 FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2228 (2013); THOMAS, supra note 1, at 14.
24 Shepherd, supra note 1, at 24; Sturiale, supra note 5, at 6; see also Grabowski et al., supra note 21, at
2157.
25 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv); Teva Pharm., USA, Inc. v. Leavitt, 548 F.3d 103, 104 (D.C. Cir. 2008);
21 C.F.R. §§ 314.94(a)(7), 314.127(a)(6)(i) (2017); Shepherd, supra note 1, at 19, 23 (a generic manufacturer
17
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filer may rely on the clinical investigations originally conducted by the pioneer
if it demonstrates that the proposed generic is “bioequivalent” to the approved
pioneer drug,26 meaning that it has similar chemical interactions in the human
body.27 The FDA may then approve the proposed generic drug for marketing,
provided all other requirements are met.28
While beneficial to consumers, generic competition can harm the incentives
for pioneer drug development by decreasing the lifetime sales of pioneer
drugs.29 The cost of pioneer drug development is over $2 billion.30 To recoup
these expenses and finance future drug development, drug pioneers rely on the
exclusive marketing rights granted by the FDA and the U.S. patent system.31
The Hatch-Waxman Act actively incentivizes pioneer drug development by
extending the pioneer’s market exclusivity period.32 The extensions
compensate the pioneer for the time spent seeking FDA approval and for
allowing the ANDA filer to piggyback off its clinical investigations.33 There
are two types of extensions.

spends only a few million dollars to bring a generic drug to market; “[w]ith these significantly lower costs,
generic companies can afford to charge a lower price for their drugs and still earn impressive profits”).
26 See supra note 25.
27 See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2228; Justina A. Molzon, The Generic Drug Approval Process, 5 J.
PHARMACY & L. 275, 277–78 (1996). Bioequivalency requires that “the rate and extent of absorption” of the
proposed generic drug cannot “show a significant difference” from that of the approved drug. 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(j)(8)(B)(i).
28 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(i)–(v) (requiring the ANDA to demonstrate that the proposed generic is the
same as the previously approved pioneer drug with respect to active ingredient, indication, dosage form, route
of administration, strength, and labeling); 355(j)(4) (requiring the FDA to approve an ANDA unless it finds,
among other things, that the ANDA has not provided sufficient evidence of the necessary requirements).
29 See Apel, supra note 5, at 108; Shepherd, supra note 1, at 20.
30 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
31 See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, at 15 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2648 (discussing
that the House Committee on Energy and Commerce Report explained that patents are designed to incentivize
innovative activities by enabling innovators to obtain greater profits than could have been obtained if direct
competition existed); WENDY H. SCHACHT & JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21129,
PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT TERM EXTENSIONS: A BRIEF EXPLANATION 1 (2002), http://www.law.umaryland.
edu/marshall/crsreports/crsdocuments/RS21129.pdf.
32 See 130 CONG. REC. 24,427 (1984) (statement of Rep. Henry Waxman) (“[A]s a matter of public
policy we, under the patent law, give that protection to the person who has put money into research and
development for an innovative and new product.”); THOMAS, supra note 1, at 18–19.
33 See Biotechnology Indus. Org. v. District of Columbia, 505 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“[T]he
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 . . . add[s] stimulus for research on new
drugs . . . through an extension of patent life to help recover the costs of obtaining FDA approval.” (quoting
130 CONG. REC. 15,846 (statement of Senator Hatch)); Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1547 (Fed. Cir.
1996); THOMAS, supra note 1, at 18–19.
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The first restores the patent term for the time lost in clinical investigations
and FDA review of the new drug application (NDA).34 Through patent term
restoration, the drug pioneer’s marketing exclusivity period is extended by
one-half the time spent conducting clinical investigations, plus the entire
period spent by the FDA in reviewing the NDA.35 The extension for patent
term restoration is capped at five years.36
As for the second type, the Hatch-Waxman Act creates marketing
exclusivities that are independent of patent protection.37 They extend the drug
pioneer’s monopoly by five years for new chemical entities and by three years
for new clinical investigations.38 The five-year marketing exclusivity is
available for drugs containing a new chemical entity (NCE), which is an active
ingredient never previously approved by the FDA.39 During the five years, the
FDA is precluded from approving an ANDA for a proposed generic containing
the same NCE.40 The Act also prevents the FDA from accepting such ANDAs
in the first instance, which has the practical effect of blocking generic market
entry for five years plus the length of the FDA’s review of the ANDA.41 If, for
example, the FDA needs two years to review the ANDA, the effect of NCE
exclusivity is to grant seven years of protection from generic competition.42 As
for the three-year marketing exclusivity, it is awarded if the pioneer’s NDA
contains new clinical investigations to support changes such as a new dosage
form or indication.43 Its purpose is to encourage drug developers to improve
FDA-approved drugs.44 Unlike NCE exclusivity, the three-year exclusivity
does not prevent the FDA from accepting an ANDA with respect to that
drug.45 Therefore the FDA is permitted to issue tentative approvals that
become effective at the end of the three-year period.46

34

35 U.S.C. § 156 (2012).
Id.; THOMAS, supra note 1, at 18.
36 35 U.S.C. § 156(g)(6)(A).
37 THOMAS, supra note 1, at 18.
38 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(F)(ii) (2012).
39 See 21 C.F.R. § 314.108(a) (2017).
40 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(F)(ii); THOMAS, supra note 1, at 433.
41 THOMAS, supra note 1, at 433.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 435.
44 See id.
45 Id. at 436. This difference between the two marketing exclusivities renders the NCE exclusivity of
more value than the three-year exclusivity. Id.
46 Id. (explaining that the FDA is permitted to do so at the close of its ANDA review if the three-year
exclusivity bars ANDA approval).
35
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B. Patent Litigation Scheme Under the Hatch-Waxman Act
Even after the marketing exclusivities run their course, a generic drug may
still be blocked from market entry by the drug pioneer’s patents. For instance,
the NCE exclusivity for the insomnia drug, Lunesta, ended in December 2009,
but the patents covering Lunesta expired in February 2014.47 An ANDA filer
must challenge the active patents blocking FDA approval to gain earlier market
entry.48 The Hatch-Waxman Act sets out a complex procedural scheme for
resolving the patent disputes between generic manufacturers and drug
pioneers.49
1. Paragraph IV Certification and the Thirty-Month Stay of FDA Approval
The Hatch-Waxman Act requires the ANDA to list the patents “to which a
claim of patent infringement could reasonably be asserted” against the
proposed generic.50 These patents are published in the Approved Drug
Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations, commonly known as the
“Orange Book.”51 The Orange Book consists of U.S. patents having claims
covering the approved active ingredients, formulations, and methods of use.52
The ANDA filer must certify as to the relevant Orange-Book listed patents.53
47 Benjamin Burck, First to File and Beyond: Paragraph IV Business Strategies, THOMSON REUTERS
INTELL. PROP. & SCI. GENERICS & API INTELLIGENCE, http://thomsonreuters.com/content/dam/openweb/
documents/pdf/pharma-life-sciences/misc/burck-paragraph-iv-webinar.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2017).
Another example involves Daiichi’s hypertension drug Benicar (olmesartan medoxomil), which gained FDA
approval on April 25, 2002. BENICAR, http://benicar.com/ (last visited Sept. 2016); Product Details No.
N021286, FDA, http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/ob/results_product.cfm?Appl_Type=N&Appl_
No=021286 (last visited Feb. 19, 2017); Patent and Exclusivity No. N021286, FDA, http://www.accessdata.
fda.gov/scripts/cder/ob/patent_info.cfm?Appl_type=N&Appl_No=021286&Product_No=001 (last visited Oct.
29, 2016). There are two patents listed in the Orange Book for Benicar—U.S. Patent Nos. 5,616,599 (the ‘599
patent) and 6,878,703 (the ‘703 patent). The ‘599 patent covers the olmesartan active compound and expires
on October 25, 2016. The ‘703 patent covers methods of treatment and would have expired on November 19,
2021. Supra Patent and Exclusivity No. N021286.
48 Sturiale, supra note 5, at 9; Erik Hovenkamp & Jorge Lemus, Pay for Go-Away: Reverse Payment
Settlements and Holdup Under PTAB 3 (Nov. 3, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2814532.
49 FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2228–29 (2013).
50 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2012).
51 See Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations, FDA (36th ed. 2016),
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/UCM071436.pdf. The Hatch-Waxman
Act requires drug pioneers to list pertinent patents it believes would be infringed by a proposed generic, in
addition to the expiration dates of those patents. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(b)(1), (c)(2); THOMAS, supra note 1, at
15–16. The FDA is required to publish this patent information in the Orange Book. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(2).
52 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(b) (2017).
53 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A); Dey Pharma, LP v. Sunovion Pharm. Inc., 677 F.3d 1158, 1159 (Fed.
Cir. 2012).
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The first two kinds of certifications, Paragraphs I and II certifications, are for
drugs without patent protection and permit immediate approval of the ANDA,
while the Paragraph III certification permits approval only after the relevant
Orange Book-listed patents have expired.54
The fourth kind, the Paragraph IV certification, challenges the drug patents
blocking generic market entry and sets off the Hatch-Waxman patent litigation
scheme.55 The Paragraph IV certification states that the drug pioneer’s patents
are invalid, unenforceable, or will not be infringed by the proposed generic.56
The ANDA filer must provide notice to the drug pioneer “of the factual and
legal basis” of its patent challenge.57 The filing of the Paragraph IV
certification is a technical act of patent infringement58 and gives the pioneer an
immediate right to sue by creating the case or controversy to support subjectmatter jurisdiction.59 If successful, the pioneer will prevent generic market
entry until after its patents expire.60
Upon receiving notice of the Paragraph IV certification, the pioneer has a
forty-five day window to sue on the relevant patents.61 If the pioneer fails to
sue within the forty-five days, the FDA is permitted to immediately approve
54

21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(I)–(III); 21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a)(12).
See Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 566 U.S. 399, 407 (2012) (“Filing a paragraph IV
certification means provoking litigation.”); see also 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B), (j)(5)(B)(iii), (j)(5)(C); 35
U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) (2012).
56 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV); 21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a)(12).
57 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B)(iii)(II); see also id. § 355(b)(3)(B) (requiring that the filer of an ANDA
containing a Paragraph IV certification provide the patent owner with notice of such action within twenty days
of filing the ANDA); 21 C.F.R. § 314.95(c)(6) (“The applicant shall include . . . (i) For each claim of a patent
alleged not to be infringed, a full and detailed explanation of why the claim is not infringed. (ii) For each claim
of a patent alleged to be invalid or unenforceable, a full and detailed explanation of the grounds supporting the
allegation.”).
58 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2). The charge of infringement under § 271(e)(2) is technical in nature because
“[a]t this stage the generic manufacturer has done nothing more than request FDA approval to market a drug.”
THOMAS, supra note 1, at 16–17.
59 See Caraco, 566 U.S. at 407, 412; Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 678 (1990). Before
the ANDA filer makes a Paragraph IV certification, the Hatch-Waxman Act provides it with a safe harbor
from patent infringement liability while it develops the generic version of the approved drug. 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(e)(1) (“It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or sell within the United States or
import into the United States a patented invention . . . solely for uses reasonably related to the development
and submission of information under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or
veterinary biological products.”); Allergan, Inc. v. Actavis, Inc., No. 2:14-CV-188, 2014 WL 7336692, at *1
(E.D. Tex. Dec. 23, 2014).
60 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(4); THOMAS, supra note 1, at 17.
61 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(C)(i); see also Janssen Pharmaceutica, N.V. v. Apotex, Inc., 540 F.3d 1353,
1356 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (stating that the pioneer has the option of suing on all, some, or none of the patents
included in the Paragraph IV Certification).
55
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the ANDA even though the pioneer drug is covered by patent protection.62 The
ANDA filer may obtain patent certainty before entering the market by seeking
a declaratory judgment for invalidity or noninfringement under the HatchWaxman amendments in the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and
Modernization Act (MMA) of 2003.63 If the drug pioneer sues within the fortyfive day window, the FDA is stayed from approving the proposed generic for
thirty months,64 preventing generic market entry and competition for that
time.65 The thirty-month stay is effectively the equivalent to an automatic
preliminary injunction and provides the drug pioneer with the opportunity to
assert its patent rights before generic market entry.66 If the ANDA litigation
lasts for longer, the FDA will approve the ANDA at the thirty-month mark
even if litigation is ongoing.67
The thirty-month stay “is likely to keep the generic drug off the market for
a lengthy period” of time.68 However, it can be terminated early if the ANDA
filer prevails in court before the expiry of the thirty-months.69 The HatchWaxman provisions contemplate that the ANDA filer can prevail in two ways.
62 See 21 U.S.C. § 355 (j)(5)(B)(iii); see, e.g., Eli Lilly, 557 F.3d at 1348; Janssen, 540 F.3d at 1356;
Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Sebelius, 856 F. Supp. 2d 196, 201 (D.D.C. 2012).
63 Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108–173,
§ 1102(a), 117 Stat. 2066, 2457–60 (2003) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2012)); 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(j)(5)(C)(i)(II) (“[A] declaratory judgment that the [listed] patent is invalid or will not be infringed by the
drug for which the applicant seeks approval . . . .”). Congress extended federal court jurisdiction over these
declaratory judgment actions “to the extent consistent with the Constitution.” Janssen, 540 F.3d at 1357
(quoting 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(5) (2012)). “Therefore, federal courts have jurisdiction over these declaratory
judgment actions to the extent that they present an Article III case or controversy.” Id.
64 Bayer AG v. Elan Pharm. Research Corp., 212 F.3d 1241, 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (stating that the FDA
must suspend approval of the ANDA until “the date that is thirty months from the date the owner of the listed
drug’s patent received notice of the filing of a Paragraph IV certification” (citing 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(I)–(III))). While the thirty-month stay blocks final approval, the FDA may still grant
“tentative approval” to an ANDA that meets all scientific and procedural standards. See 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(II)(dd)(AA); Mylan, 856 F. Supp. 2d at 201 n.3. But a generic drug that has been
“tentatively approved” may not be legally marketed until the FDA issues a final approval letter. See 21 C.F.R.
§§ 314.105(d), 314.107(b)(3)(v) (2017).
65 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii); Mylan, 856 F. Supp. 2d at 201.
66 See, e.g., Mylan, 856 F. Supp. 2d at 201; Ben Venue Labs., Inc. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 146 F.
Supp. 2d 572, 578 (D.N.J. 2001); THOMAS, supra note 1, at 17.
67 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii); see also Hovenkamp, supra note 48, at 11. If the generic manufacturer
enters the market before the ANDA litigation concludes, it risks “being held liable for treble damages for
willful infringement if the court later” rules in favor of the pioneer drug developer. Sturiale, supra note 5, at
10.
68 Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 566 U.S. 399, 408 (2012).
69 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(I); Hovenkamp, supra note 48, at 11. On the other hand, if the ANDA
filer loses in court before the end of the thirty-months, FDA approval will “be made effective on the date the
court determines that the patent will expire or otherwise orders.” 21 C.F.R. § 314.107(b)(3)(iii).
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First, if a district court rules that the relevant patents are invalid,
unenforceable, or not infringed, the FDA will approve the ANDA on “the date
on which the court enters judgment reflecting the decision.”70 An appeal will
not reinstate the stay.71 Alternatively, the stay will be lifted if on appeal, the
Federal Circuit finds the relevant patents invalid or not infringed, even if the
ANDA filer loses in district court.72 As a side note, the stay may also end or be
extended if a court finds that either party improperly delays the litigation,73
among others.74
2. Incentives to Challenge the Patents Blocking Generic Market Entry
The Paragraph IV certification process “actively incentivizes” ANDA filers
“to challenge the validity of brand patents before they expire.”75 Congress was
concerned that invalid patents were blocking generic competition and created
incentives for ANDA filers to weed out invalid drug patents.76 Congress was
also cognizant of the high barriers to generic market entry; ANDA litigation
can cost up to $5 million through trial and the ANDA filer additionally risks
incurring liability for patent infringement.77

70 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(I)(aa); see also 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(C)(i) (“[I]f before the expiration of
[the thirty-month] period the district court decides that the patent is invalid or not infringed (including any
substantive determination that there is no cause of action for patent infringement or invalidity), the [FDA]
approval shall be made effective on the date on—which the court enters judgment reflecting that decision”); 21
C.F.R. § 314.107(b)(3)(ii).
71 Sanofi-Aventis v. FDA, 725 F. Supp. 2d 92, 100 (D.D.C. 2010) (stating Congress intended “that the
entry of judgment by the district court be the event that triggers the termination of the thirty-month stay
notwithstanding any subsequent appeal or ruling by the appellate court”).
72 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(c)(3)(C)(ii)(I)(aa), (j)(5)(B)(iii)(II)(aa) (“[I]f before expiration of [the thirty-month]
period the district court decides that the patent has been infringed—if the judgment of the district court is
appealed, the approval shall be made effective on the date on which the court of appeals decides that the patent
is invalid or not infringed . . . .” (emphasis added)). The thirty-month stay also ends if a court of appeals
endorses a settlement agreement stating that the patent is invalid or not infringed before issuing an opinion.
Sanofi-Aventis, 725 F. Supp. 2d at 99.
73 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii); see also Eli Lilly & Co. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 557 F.3d 1346, 1348
(Fed. Cir. 2009); 21 C.F.R. § 314.107(b)(3)(i)(A).
74 See infra Section V.A.
75 Shepherd, supra note 1, at 23–24; 149 CONG. REC. S16104 (daily ed. Dec. 9, 2003) (statement of Sen.
Hatch) (the Act gives “an incentive for vigorous patent challenges”).
76 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN FTC STUDY 4–5
(2002) (interpreting the Hatch-Waxman Act).
77 AM. INTELL. PROP. LAW ASS’N, 2015 REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 37–38 (2015), http://files.
ctctcdn.com/e79ee274201/b6ced6c3-d1ee-4ee7-9873-352dbe08d8fd.pdf (for a controversy greater than $25
million, median litigation costs for ANDA litigation are $3 million through the end of discovery and $5
million through trial).
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One incentive permits the FDA to accept the Paragraph IV ANDA one year
early—beginning on the fourth, rather than fifth, year of NCE exclusivity.78
The ANDA filer may then start the patent litigation suit during the fourth year
of NCE exclusivity, and possibly gain earlier market entry.79 ANDA
submission during year four may increase the risk of lengthening the stay of
FDA approval.80 Nevertheless, Paragraph IV ANDA filers tend to submit their
ANDAs on the first date possible, the fourth anniversary of the FDA’s
approval of the NDA.81
The Hatch-Waxman Act also incentivizes Paragraph IV patent challenges
by creating a lucrative reward, the 180-day exclusivity, for the first generic to
submit a Paragraph IV ANDA (first filer).82 During the 180-day period, all
other generic competitors are blocked from the market,83 creating a duopoly
and allowing the first filer to shadow the pioneer’s high price.84 The
exclusivity period is so valuable for the first filer that the Generic
Pharmaceutical Association estimates that the “vast majority of potential
profits for a generic drug manufacturer materialize during the 180-day
exclusivity period.”85 Afterwards, other generic manufacturers will enter the
market and rapidly drive down prices and the first filer’s profits.86
78

21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(F)(ii); see also 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.101(e)(2)(ii), 314.108(b)(2) (2017).
See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) (2012); Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 566 U.S. 399, 407
(2012) (the filing of the Paragraph IV certification creates the case or controversy to confer jurisdiction on
federal courts); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 678 (1990).
80 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(F)(ii) (allowing the thirty-month stay to be “extended by such amount of time (if
any) which is required for seven and one-half years to have elapsed from the date of approval”); see also 21
C.F.R. § 314.107(b)(3)(i)(B) (ANDA “approval may be made effective at the expiration of the 7 1/2 years
from the date of approval of the application for the patented drug product”); THOMAS, supra note 1, at 17–18.
81 See, e.g., Burck, supra note 47, at 24.
82 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (establishing exclusivity period); see, e.g., Janssen Pharmaceutica, N.V.
v. Apotex, Inc., 540 F.3d 1353, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2008). The first filer is awarded the 180-day exclusivity
regardless of whether or not the NDA holder brings suit. Sturiale, supra note 5, at 13–14.
83 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv); FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2229 (2013) (during the 180-day
period, “no other generic can compete with the brand-name drug”). The FDA enforces the first filer’s market
exclusivity by delaying approval of subsequent ANDAs until the 180-day period has expired. 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(j)(5)(B)(iv); Janssen, 540 F.3d at 1356; 21 C.F.R. § 314.107(c)(1).
84 Grabowski et al., supra note 21 (“[d]uring the 180-day exclusivity period,” the first filer “provides
only limited price discounts compared to the” pioneer drug “and thus earns substantial revenues and profits”);
Shepherd, supra note 1, at 24; Sturiale, supra note 5, at 11.
85 Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2229. The 180-day exclusivity is possibly “worth several hundred million
dollars.” Id. (quoting C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a Regulatory
Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553, 1579 (2006)). The exclusivity reward is so valuable that it has given
rise to “reverse payment” settlements (also known as pay-for-delay settlements), in which the pioneer pays the
generic to delay entering the market. The pioneer is then able to charge higher prices than if the first filer had
prevailed in the litigation. In 2003, Congress attempted to remedy this problem with several amendments to
the Hatch-Waxman Act in the MMA. See generally C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical
79
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The 180-day exclusivity will be awarded to multiple ANDA filers if they
submit substantially complete ANDAs on the same day.87 Most 180-day
exclusivities are now shared, as an unintended consequence of the MMA of
2003.88 The impact of shared exclusivity has been to substantially decrease the
first filers’ profits and to change the economics of Hatch-Waxman litigation.89
ANDA filers can no longer afford to spend millions in legal fees to challenge
Orange Book-listed patents and are seeking to cut litigation costs.90 Since
2012, new administrative proceedings have provided ANDA filers with an
additional, cost-effective avenue for challenging the Orange Book-listed
patents blocking generic entry.
II. CHALLENGING ORANGE BOOK-LISTED PATENTS VIA IPR
AND PGR REVIEW
The America Invents Act (AIA) of 2011 introduced new post-grant patent
proceedings that are becoming an integral part of Hatch-Waxman litigations.91
The purpose of these proceedings is to encourage “meritorious patentability
challenges” to “further improve patent quality.”92 Section A of this Part
describes the new post-grant proceedings, which include inter partes review
(IPR), post-grant review (PGR), and covered business review (CBM) and are
adjudicated by the Patent Trials and Appeal Board (PTAB), an arm of the
USPTO.93 The PTAB is a cost-effective alternative to the district courts for
adjudicating patent validity, but unlike the district courts, it does not decide
Patent Settlement as a Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553, 1579 (2006) (describing the 180day exclusivity as a “bounty” that “provides a substantial inducement to challenge drug patents”).
86 Grabowski et al., supra note 21. Even after other generic manufacturers enter the market, the first filer
may still “benefit from a ‘first mover’ advantage, meaning that even when price is matched, the first generic
manufacturer may be likely to capture a higher share of the market.” Id.
87 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(B)(iv)(II)(bb) (defining a “first applicant” as any applicant that submits a
“substantially complete” application “on the first day on which a[nother] substantially complete application”
was submitted); THOMAS, supra note 1, at 19, 25.
88 Scott A. McKeown, Generic Pharma Leverages PTAB, PATS. POST-GRANT (Mar. 20, 2014), http://
www.patentspostgrant.com/generic-pharma-eyes-ptab.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Pub. L. No. 112–29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
92 Coalition for Affordable Drugs VI, LLC v. Celgene Corp., No. IPR2015-01092, at 4 (P.T.A.B. Sept.
25, 2015); see also Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 814 F.3d 1309, 1326–27 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(Newman, J., dissenting) (“The America Invents Act responds to concerns that the time and cost and
uncertainty of resolving patent validity challenges are a disincentive to development and commercialization of
new science and technology.”); 157 Cong. Rec. S952 at S.23 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 2011) (statement of Sen.
Grassley) (stating that IPRs will “provide faster, less costly alternatives to civil litigation”).
93 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–319, 321–329 (2012).
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questions of infringement.94 Section B of this Part highlights the advantages of
the PTAB for patent challengers.
A. Inter Partes Review and Post-Grant Review
Of the three types of AIA proceedings, IPRs are most relevant to HatchWaxman litigations. As of March 2016, one study identified 228 IPR petitions
filed on Orange Book-listed patents and just a handful of PGR and CBM
petitions, with 152 of the IPR petitions filed by generic manufacturers.95 That
is a significant increase from past years; in 2015, only 151 IPR petitions were
filed on Orange Book-listed patents while 49 were filed in 2014.96 The increase
can partly be explained by the explosion of Paragraph IV challenges in recent
years; 467 Paragraph IV challenges were filed over proposed generics in 2015,
compared to a yearly average of 269 between 2009 and 2013.97
IPR proceedings are an attractive option for ANDA filers with strong prior
art and weak noninfringement positions. IPRs are instituted on the basis of
anticipation or obviousness challenges using patents or printed publications
and are only available beginning nine months after patent issuance.98 An IPR
petitioner who files with weak prior art will risk losing at the PTAB, which
may bolster the patent owner’s validity arguments in district court.99 If the
ANDA filer possesses strong noninfringement positions, it may also avoid IPR
proceedings; the PTAB may broadly construe the claims, which could weaken
the ANDA filer’s noninfringement arguments in the district court litigation.
In comparison, PGR proceedings can be used to challenge patentability on
more expansive grounds than anticipation or obviousness in light of printed

94

See 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–319, 321–329. Only a federal court may address questions of infringement; a
federal court could “conclude that the patent claims are not infringed” if it “has devised an alternative,
noninfringing means of achieving bioequivalence.” Sturiale, supra note 5, at 5 n.19, 10 n.51.
95 Kevin E. Noonan, PTAB Statistics from Spring BIO IPCC Meeting, PAT. DOCS (Apr. 17, 2016), http://
www.patentdocs.org/2016/04/ptab-statistics-from-spring-bio-ipcc-meeting.html; see also Grant Shackelford,
Challenging Orange Book-Listed Patents in AIA Reviews, IIPRD 2015 Symposium, slides 5 & 8 (2015),
http://www.patentofficetrials.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/orangebook2.pdf.
96 Ryan Davis, The Firms That Handle the Most ANDA Patent Cases, LAW360 (Apr. 26, 2016, 10:37
PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/787767/the-firms-that-handle-the-most-anda-patent-cases.
97 Id.; Shepherd, supra note 1, at 24.
98 35 U.S.C. §§ 311(b), 311(c)(1). The PTAB will institute an IPR if “there is a reasonable likelihood that
the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Id. § 314(a).
99 A Practical Guide to Inter Partes Review, WILMERHALE (2013), http://www.wilmerhale.com/
uploadedfiles/wilmerhale_shared_content/wilmerhale_files/events/wilmerhale-webinar-ipr1-20jun13.pdf.
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prior art.100 They are available for patents only during the nine months after
issuance and with an effective filing date on or after March 16, 2013.101 The
USPTO has yet to issue many patent applications after this filing date, so there
have been few PGR filings to date.102 As more PGR-eligible patents issue,
PGR proceedings may become more common in Hatch-Waxman litigations.
But IPRs will remain the most relevant for two main reasons. Petitioners
are hesitant to use PGRs due to their broad estoppel effects which bar the
petitioner from later raising any claim it “raised or reasonably could have
raised during that” PGR.103 Because a PGR petitioner “can challenge validity
on practically any ground,” unlike in IPR where the grounds may only be
based on anticipation and obviousness, the estoppel that attaches to PGR is
much broader.104 The other reason is that generic manufacturers may not be
monitoring pioneer drug patents closely enough to bring challenges in time for
the nine-month window.
CMB review is not particularly relevant to pharmaceutical patent litigation
because it is only available for patents directed to “financial product[s] or
service[s].”105 The CBM petitioner must additionally have been sued for
infringement.106 So far, the PTAB has denied most, if not all, CBM petitions
filed on Orange Book-listed patents on the basis that they do not qualify for
CBM treatment.107
100

35 U.S.C. § 321(b) (2012); 37 C.F.R. § 42.204 (2017) (listing “statutory grounds permitted under 35
U.S.C. § 282(b)(2) or (3)”). A petitioner can request PGR on any grounds of 35 U.S.C. § 101 (patentable
subject matter), § 102 (prior use, sales, public availability, and printed publications), § 103 (obviousness),
§ 112 (written description, enablement, indefiniteness, but not best mode), and § 251 (new matter in reissue
patents). 35 U.S.C. § 321(b).
101 35 U.S.C. § 321(c). The PTAB will institute a PGR if the petitioner has demonstrated that “it is more
likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” Id. § 324(a) (2012).
102 Paul R. Gugliuzza, (In)valid Patents, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 271, 283 (2016); Shepherd, supra note
1, at 32.
103 35 U.S.C. § 325(e) (2012); Gugliuzza, supra note 102, at 283.
104 Gugliuzza, supra note 102, at 283; 35 U.S.C. §§ 311(b), 321(b).
105 37 C.F.R § 42.301(a) (defining a covered business method patent as “a patent that claims a method or
corresponding apparatus for performing data processing or other operations used in the practice,
administration, or management of a financial product or service, except that the term does not include patents
for technological inventions”). The Federal Circuit has instructed that “the definition of ‘covered business
method patent’ is not limited to products and services of only the financial industry, or to patents owned by or
directly affecting the activities of financial institutions such as banks and brokerage houses.” Versata Dev.
Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2510 (2016).
106 37 C.F.R § 42.302(a).
107 Roxane Labs. v. Jazz Pharm., Inc., No. CBM2014-00161 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 9, 2015); Par Pharm., Inc. v.
Jazz Pharm., Inc., No. CBM2014-00149 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 13, 2015). Note that it may be possible for “Risk
Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies (REMS)” type patents, which are listed in the Orange Book, to be eligible
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B. Advantages of PTAB Litigation over District Court Litigation
The AIA establishes some “powerful incentive[s] to challenge patent
validity in the PTAB.”108 Generic manufacturers are using the IPR proceedings
to challenge Orange Book-listed patents blocking ANDA approval and generic
market entry.109
Litigation before the PTAB litigation is faster and less expensive than in
district court.110 By statute, the PTAB must resolve IPRs and PGRs within
twelve to eighteen months from institution compared to the twenty-five to
thirty-two months typically required in district courts.111 Litigation at the
PTAB is generally less expensive due to the reduced timeframe and the limited
nature of discovery.112 An IPR proceeding will cost up to $350,000 while the
total ANDA litigation can cost up to $5 million.113 Some ANDA filers are

for CBM review. These patents cover the REMS protocols mandated by the FDA for high-risk drugs. The
PTAB has so far denied institution for CBM review of Orange Book-listed REMS patents but has never stated
that REMS-type patents are ineligible for CBM review. Adam C. Krol & Muna Abu-Shaar, Safety, Innovation,
or Access? REMS Creates Another Battlefront Between Branded & Generic Pharmaceuticals, THE AIPLA
ANTITRUST NEWS, Apr. 2015, at 5, 12–13, http://www.aipla.org/committees/committee_pages/
antitrust-law/Committee%20Documents/Antitrust%20News/2015/AIPLA%20Antitrust%20News%20April%
202015.pdf; Andrew Williams, PTAB Update—No Institution of CBM Patent Review for Jazz’s Orange Book
Listed Patents, PAT. DOCS (Jan. 15, 2015), http://www.patentdocs.org/2015/01/ptab-update-no-institution-ofcbm-patent-review-for-jazzs-orange-book-listed-patents-.html.
108 Merck & Cie v. Gnosis S.P.A., 808 F.3d 829, 840 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
109 See supra note 95 and accompanying text. The PTAB will institute an IPR if it determines that there is
a “reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1” challenged patent claim. 35
U.S.C. § 314(a) (2012). For PGRs, the petitioner must show that it is “more likely than not” that at least one
challenged claim is unpatentable. Id. § 324(a).
110 See, e.g., Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 814 F.3d 1309, 1326–27 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(Newman, J., dissenting) (stating that IPRs will “provide faster, less costly, alternatives to civil litigation”
(quoting 157 Cong. Rec. S952 at S.23 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 2011) (statement of Sen. Grassley))).
111 See 35 U.S.C. § 326(a)(11)–(c) (2012) (requiring the PTAB to issue a final written decision within
twelve months of institution); 37 C.F.R. § 42.200(c) (2017) (providing a maximum extension of six months
“for good cause”); Howard W. Levine et al., Inter Partes Review in Generic Drug Litigation—Why the USPTO
Should Exercise Its Discretion to Deny IPR Petitions in Appropriate Hatch-Waxman Act Disputes, FINNEGAN
(Mar. 7, 2014), http://www.finnegan.com/resources/articles/articlesdetail.aspx?news=ef284b32-7634-4bc3b718-7d387a8bc57f; see also Shepherd, supra note 1, at 19.
112 Compare 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(5) (2012) (limiting IPR discovery to evidence “necessary in the interest
of justice”), and 35 U.S.C. § 326(a)(5) (limiting PGR discovery to “evidence directly related to factual
assertions advanced by either party in the proceeding”), with FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) (defining the scope of
discoverable material in federal courts).
113 AM. INTELL. PROP. LAW ASS’N, supra note 77, at 37–38; see also McKeown, supra note 88 (stating
that IPR costs can “be between 10% and 20% of that of district court litigation”).
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particularly cost conscious, such as first filers who are forced to share the 180day exclusivity and subsequent ANDA filers.114
In addition to cost and speed, the PTAB uses legal standards that are
favorable to patent challengers. As a result, invalidity arguments may fare
better at the PTAB than in district courts; there have been instances where the
PTAB invalidated claims previously upheld as not invalid by a district court
over many of the same prior art references.115 One significant difference is the
lower burden of proof applied by the PTAB to establish unpatentability. A
patent challenger must prove invalidity by clear and convincing evidence in
district court, but must only establish it by “a preponderance of the evidence”
before the PTAB.116 The PTAB also gives a broader claim construction to
challenged claims, making invalidation easier by opening them up to a larger
universe of prior art. The PTAB gives claims their “broadest reasonable
interpretation,” which is broader than the Phillips “ordinary and customary
meaning” standard employed by federal courts.117 In addition to broader claim
construction, the PTAB does not apply the presumption of validity.118 Federal
courts presume that issued patents are valid.119 In view of that presumption,
federal judges and juries are hesitant to invalidate claims issued by the
USPTO, especially when the particular prior art references were already
114 See McKeown, supra note 88; Christopher R. Noyes, When Inter Partes Review Meets Hatch-Waxman
Patents, LAW360 (Sept. 9, 2014, 7:58 AM), https://www.wilmerhale.com/uploadedFiles/Shared_
Content/Editorial/Publications/Documents/Law360-when-inter-partes-review-meets-hatch-waxman-patents9Sep14.pdf.
115 E.g., Noven Pharm., Inc. v. Novartis AG, IPR2014-00550, at 3, 7 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 28, 2015) (finding
claims 7 and 16 of the ‘031 patent obvious over the combined teachings of Enz and Sasaki); Novartis Pharms.
Inc. v. Noven Pharms. Inc., 125 F. Supp. 3d 474, 479, 487 (D. Del. Aug. 31, 2015) (finding claims 7 and 16 of
the ‘031 patent not invalid as obvious over the asserted prior art references, which included Enz and Sasaki).
116 35 U.S.C. §§ 282(a), 316(e) (2012).
117 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2017) (defining “broadest reasonable construction”). Compare Phillips v.
AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–18 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (using “ordinary and customary meaning”
standard), with Facebook, Inc. v. Pragmatus AV, LLC, 582 Fed. App’x 864, 869 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“The
broadest reasonable interpretation of a claim term may be the same as or broader than the construction of a
term under the Phillips standard. But it cannot be narrower.”). In at least one case, a difference in the claim
construction standard resulted in different dispositions. See, e.g., Patent Owner Allergan Sales, LLC’s
Preliminary Response at 2–3, Ferrum Ferro Capital, LLC v. Allergan Sales, LLC, No. IPR2015-00858 (Mar. 9,
2015) (The Federal Circuit majority found claim 4 of the ‘149 Patent not invalid. However, when interpreted
under the broadest reasonable interpretation standard applicable in IPR proceedings, claim 4 would have been
invalid for obviousness.).
118 See, e.g., In re Swanson, 540 F.3d 1368, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2008); cf. Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758
F.2d 594, 605 (Fed. Cir.), on reh’g, 771 F.2d 480 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (explaining that litigation presumption of
patent validity does not apply in reexamination proceedings, as purpose of such proceedings is “the remedy of
administrative error”).
119 See 35 U.S.C. § 282(a).
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considered during patent examination.120 The PTAB is more willing to accept
such prior art as grounds for unpatentability.121
Generic manufacturers also prefer the PTAB because of the character of the
decisionmaker.122 Oftentimes the generic must base its invalidity positions on
highly technical obviousness arguments. IPRs and PGRs take place before a
panel of Administrative Patent Judges (APJs) who possess the relevant
scientific knowledge, oftentimes in the technical area of the dispute.123 By
comparison, district court judges and juries generally possess limited
knowledge of the technology and patent laws.124 APJs are more likely to
understand and appreciate the obviousness arguments due to their scientific
expertise.125 In part because of these differences, challengers have succeeded
in invalidating patents on the basis of obviousness at a higher rate at the PTAB
than in the district courts.126
120 See, e.g., Norian Corp. v. Stryker Corp., 363 F.3d 1321, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding that a patent is
presumed valid, in part because of the expertise of patent examiners and the presumption that they have done
their jobs properly).
121 See Merck & Cie v. Gnosis S.P.A., 808 F.3d 829, 840 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (holding that for PTAB
proceedings, the AIA eliminates “any deference to the prior examination and grant of the patent”).
122 THE PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO TRIALS BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD 21–22 (Erika
Harmon Arner & Joseph E. Palys eds., 2014). “On the other hand, if the patent challenger has a great story to
tell and the technology is relatively straightforward, [district court litigation] may be preferred.” Jason E. Stach
& Jeffrey A. Freeman, District Court or the PTO: Choosing Where to Litigate Patent Invalidity, FINNEGAN
(Mar./Apr. 2014), http://www.finnegan.com/resources/articles/articlesdetail.aspx?news=e7ad4528-cec4-4889a23d-d17bca527ca2. The PTAB limits the ability of the patent owner to tell an invention story. Office Patent
Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,768 (Aug. 14, 2012) (“The [PTAB] does not envision that live
testimony is necessary at oral argument. However, parties may file a motion for live testimony in appropriate
situations.”).
123 See 35 U.S.C. § 6 (2012) (defining APJs as “persons of competent legal knowledge and scientific
ability”); Melissa F. Wasserman, The Changing Guard of Patent Law: Chevron Deference for the PTO, 54
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1959, 1974 n.66 (2013) (“Each APJ has a law degree, is admitted to practice law in at
least one state bar, and holds at least a bachelor’s degree in science or engineering.” (citing JAMES MOORE ET
AL., A VIEW BEHING [SIC] THE CURTAIN: THE BPAI DECISION MAKING PROCESS 2 (2010), http://usptols.org/
uploads/A_View_Behind_the_Curtain__6_-UPDATE100408.pdf)).
124 THE PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO TRIALS BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD, supra note
122, at 21–22. There are some exceptions; for example, the District of Delaware hears numerous HatchWaxman cases. See Davis, supra note 96 (“ANDA litigation is overwhelmingly concentrated in the District of
Delaware.”).
125 Bernard Knight, New Ways to Invalidate Pharmaceutical Patents—Brands and Generics Need to
Change Their Intellectual Property Business Models, PHARM. L. & INDUS. REP. 347 (2014).
126 For PTAB proceedings, data through 2015 shows that 49.6% of the claims initially challenged were
found unpatentable for obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103. Fitzpatrick, Cella, Harper & Scinto, 2016 Findings
on USPTO Contested Proceedings, 2 POST-GRANT HQ REPORTER 1, 10 (2016), http://www.postgranthq.com/
wp-content/uploads/2014/10/PostgrantHQ_Reporter.pdf. By comparison, the district courts invalidated claims
under § 103 at a rate of 27.8%. John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & David L. Schwartz, Understanding the
Realities of Modern Patent Litigation, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1769, 1784, 1787 fig.4 (2014). The percentages for
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So far, the most common PTAB challenges against Orange Book-listed
patents are IPRs challenging the validity of ancillary patents. These types of
patents cover the ancillary aspects of a drug, such as the drug’s chemical
variants, formulations, methods of administration, and combinations, rather
than the active ingredient.127 Pioneer-drug developers apply for ancillary
patents and list them in the Orange Book to extend the duration of patent
protection and market exclusivity; some scholars refer to this strategy as
“evergreening.”128 General manufacturers are more likely to challenge
ancillary patents, because the patents covering the active ingredient are
difficult to invalidate.129 By challenging ancillary patents through IPR, generic
manufacturers are counteracting evergreening and benefiting consumers,130 but
this new litigation strategy raises some unanticipated questions.
III. PTAB DECISION AND FEDERAL CIRCUIT APPEAL CAN PREDATE THE END
OF THE THIRTY-MONTH PERIOD
ANDA filers have been using IPRs as part of their Hatch-Waxman
litigation strategy,131 raising an important question concerning the thirty-month
stay of FDA approval. If the PTAB invalidates the patents blocking generic
entry before expiry of the thirty months, it is unclear whether the stay should
end or continue afterwards.132 That question arises when the PTAB decision
successful 35 U.S.C. § 102 (anticipation) challenges were 37.5% at the PTAB and 31.1% in district courts. Id.;
Fitzpatrick, Cella, Harper & Scinto, NewYorkBio Conference May 5, 2015, Large Molecules, Small
Proceedings: The Intersection of Biologics and IPRs, slide 12 (2015), http://www.fitzpatrickcella.com/wpcontent/uploads/BioNewYork%20Presentation_05_04_15.pptx.
127 See Erica J. Pascal, Are IPRs Impacting the Pharmaceutical Industry?, DLA PIPER (2015),
https://www.dlapiper.com/en/us/insights/publications/2015/06/ipt-news-q2-2015/are-iprs-impacting-thepharmaceutical-industry/; cf. Michael R. Herman, Note, The Stay Dilemma: Examining Brand and Generic
Incentives for Delaying the Resolution of Pharmaceutical Patent Litigation, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1788, 1799
(2011) (discussing “evergreening,” where pioneer drug companies’ file patents on follow-on developments
rather than new active ingredients).
128 C. Scott Hemphill & Bhaven N. Sampat, When Do Generics Challenge Drug Patents?, 8 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 613, 615, 642 (2011).
129 Pascal, supra note 127.
130 See Inside Views: Q&A with Erich Spangenberg on Patents and Drug Prices, INTELL. PROP. WATCH
(Mar. 6, 2016), http://www.ip-watch.org/2016/06/03/qa-with-erich-spangenberg-on-patents-and-drug-prices/
#comments.
131 Stephanie E. O’Byrne, IPRs and ANDA Litigation: All a Matter of Timing, 62 FED. LAW., Jan./Feb.
2015, at 54; see, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Accord Healthcare Inc., No. 1:14-cv-00389-SEB-TAB, 2015 WL
8675158, at *1 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 11, 2015) (granting defendant’s motion to stay district court litigation pending
completion of IPR of patents at issue in this case). Outside of the Hatch-Waxman context, accused infringers
commonly seek IPRs. See, e.g., Endo Pharm., Inc. v. Depomed, Inc., No. IPR2014-00652, at 3–4 (P.T.A.B.
Sept. 16, 2015) (discussing seven related co-pending federal district court cases).
132 See Sturiale, supra note 5, at 42–43.
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and Federal Circuit appeal predate the end of the thirty-month period. The
ANDA filer can obtain the PTAB and Federal Circuit’s decisions before the
thirty-months’ end if it initiates the IPR or PGR before submitting the
Paragraph IV ANDA, as demonstrated in section B of this Part. Section A
explains that ANDA filers are able to bring these types of pre-suit patent
challenges because the PTAB has no standing requirement to file an IPR or
PGR petition.
A. Prospective ANDA Filers Can Bring Pre-Suit Patent Challenges at the
PTAB
A party need not have Article III standing to participate in an IPR or
PGR.133 The lack of standing requirements permits generally anyone besides
the patent owner to petition for institution of an IPR or PGR proceeding.134
The petitioner does not need to have been charged with infringement or even
establish an interest in practicing the technology covered by the patent.135 The
party may petition for review so long as it does so within one year if previously
served with an infringement complaint136 and it did not previously seek a
declaratory judgment of non-infringement or invalidity on the same patent.137
Therefore a generic manufacturer does not need to wait until the drug
developer sues to challenge patent validity before the PTAB.138 The generic
133

E.g., Consumer Watchdog v. Wis. Alumni Research Found., 753 F.3d 1258, 1261 (Fed. Cir. 2014),
cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1401 (2015) (“Article III standing is not necessarily a requirement to appear before an
administrative agency.”). Compare 37 C.F.R. § 42.101 (2017) (defining who can petition for inter partes
review), and id. § 42.201 (2017) (defining who can petition for a post-grant review), with U.S. CONST. art. 3,
§ 2 (defining the case or controversy requirement), and Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61,
573–74 (1992).
134 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.101 (defining who can petition for inter partes review), 42.201 (2017) (defining who
can petition for a post-grant review); see, e.g., Allergan, Inc. v. Ferrum Ferro Capital, LLC, No. 8:15-cv-00992
(C.D. Cal. June 19, 2015); Coalition for Affordable Drugs II LLC v. NPS Pharm., Inc., No. IPR2015-00990
(P.T.A.B. June 3, 2015); Initiative for Responsibility in Drug Pricing LLC v. Wyeth LLC, No. IPR2014-01259
(P.T.A.B. Feb. 13, 2015).
135 See O’Byrne, supra note 131, at 56; supra note 134 and accompanying text.
136 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) (2012) (mandating that an ANDA defendant must file for IPR within twelve
months of receiving the infringement complaint).
137 35 U.S.C. § 315(a)(1) (“[I]nter partes review may not be instituted if before the date on which the
petition for such a review is filed, the petitioner or real party in interest filed a civil action challenging the
validity of a claim of the patent.”); 37 C.F.R. § 42.201 (prohibiting post-grant review from being instituted
“[b]efore the date on which the petition for review is filed, the petitioner or real party-in-interest filed a civil
action challenging the validity of a claim of the patent”). These bars serve to conserve judicial resources by
forcing the patent challenger to choose one forum for resolving the validity issues.
138 American Conference Inst., Paragraph IV Disputes Master Symposium 10, http://www.lockelord.com/
newsandevents/events/2015/09/~/media/7B03704225DE44BC927F92AC555C104A.ashx (last visited Mar. 2,
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manufacturer can challenge patent validity before filing its Paragraph IV
ANDA with the FDA. During that time, a declaratory judgment action for
invalidity in district court would be impossible.139 The generic manufacturer
may even bring the patent challenge before the fourth year of NCE
exclusivity.140 That allows the generic manufacturer to circumvent the NCE
exclusivity provisions, which prohibit challenges against Orange-book listed
patents in district court before the fourth year of NCE exclusivity.141
The generic manufacturer may prevail in invalidating any patents blocking
generic entry by the fifth year of NCE exclusivity, which is the earliest
permissible date of generic market entry irrespective of patent protection.142
That allows the generic manufacturer to launch its product on the earliest
possible date.143 It may even have an appeal from the PTAB decision by that
date, allowing it to launch without risk of patent infringement liability.144
B. By Bringing a Pre-Suit IPR or PGR Challenge, the ANDA Filer Can
Obtain a PTAB Decision and Federal Circuit Appeal Before the End of the
Thirty-Month Period
To obtain the PTAB and Federal Circuit’s decisions before the expiry of
the thirty months, the generic manufacturer should bring a pre-ANDA suit
challenge at the PTAB to the relevant Orange Book-listed patents.145 The
Federal Circuit appeal can be completed before the thirty months’ end if the
generic manufacturer brings the challenge before the fourth year of NCE
exclusivity, given the relevant timeframes. IPRs and PGRs are completed in
eighteen to twenty-four months from start to finish.146 If the PTAB finds the

2017) (discussing how IPR and PGR “petitions may be filed in advance of traditional Paragraph IV
litigation”).
139 See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
140 McKeown, supra note 88.
141 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(F)(ii) (2012).
142 Id.; McKeown, supra note 88.
143 See supra notes 78–79 and 140–42 and accompanying text.
144 McKeown, supra note 88. To seek judicial review of the PTAB’s decision in the Federal Circuit, the
generic manufacturer must meet the constitutional requirements for standing. See Consumer Watchdog v.
WARF, 753 F.3d 1258, 1261 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
145 Assuming the patent owner files an infringement suit within the forty-five-day timeframe and initiates
the Paragraph IV process.
146 After the petitioner files an IPR or PGR petition, the patent owner has three months to file a
preliminary response, see 37 C.F.R. § 42.207(b) (2017), and the Director has three months from the time the
patent owner files a preliminary response to determine whether to institute a PGR, see 35 U.S.C. § 324(c)(1)
(2012). Once instituted, the PTAB must issue a final decision within one year, but “may, for good cause
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claims unpatentable, the patent owner would appeal that decision to the
Federal Circuit.147 The Federal Circuit appeal should take about eighteen
months.148 During or after the Federal Circuit appeal, the generic manufacturer
would submit its Paragraph IV ANDA to the FDA on the fourth year of NCE
exclusivity.
Some generic manufactures have already embraced this strategy of
preemptively bringing patent challenges at the PTAB in advance of traditional
Paragraph IV litigation.149 This strategy was employed by Paragraph IV
ANDA filers, Apotex Inc. and Mylan Inc., against Novartis’s $2.5 billion
multiple sclerosis drug, Gilenya.150 Gilenya was initially approved by the FDA
in 2010151 and is covered by four Orange Book-listed patents—the earliest
expiring in 2019 and the latest in 2027.152 Apotex and Mylan petitioned for
IPR of the second-latest expiring patent, U.S. Patent No. 8,324,283 (the ‘283
patent), before submitting ANDAs with the FDA.153 Apotex filed its IPR
petition in December 2014154 before submitting a Paragraph IV ANDA with

shown, extend the 1-year period by not more than 6 months.” 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(11) (2012); see also 37
C.F.R. § 42.200(c).
147 See 37 C.F.R. § 90.2 (2017).
148 After the PTAB’s final written decision, the patent owner may seek rehearing within thirty days, 37
C.F.R. § 42.71(d)(2), or appeal to the Federal Circuit within sixty-three days from either the PTAB’s final
written decision or decision on rehearing, 37 C.F.R. § 90.3(a)(3). After the patent owner files a notice of
appeal, the USPTO has forty days to transmit the record to the Federal Circuit. 35 U.S.C. § 143 (2012); FED.
CIR. R. 17(b)(1). The Federal Circuit’s median time to disposition for appeals from the USPTO is ten months.
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FED. CIRCUIT, MEDIAN TIME TO DISPOSITION IN CASES TERMINATED AFTER
HEARING OR SUBMISSION [hereinafter MEDIAN TIME TO DISPOSITION], http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/
default/files/the-court/statistics/mediandisptimemerits.table.sy05-14.pdf (last visited Jan. 8, 2016).
149 See O’Byrne, supra note 131, at 56–57 (for example, Apotex filed pre-suit patent challenges at the
PTAB against Wyeth and Alcon’s Orange Book-listed patents).
150 Joe C. Mathew, Torrent Wins Patent Battle Against Novartis’ $2.5 Billion Drug Gilenya in US, BUS.
TODAY INDIA (Nov. 17, 2015, 8:49 PM), http://www.businesstoday.in/sectors/pharma/torrent-wins-patentbattle-against-novartis-usd-2.5-billion-drug-gilenya-in-us/story/224308.html (“With $2.5 billion annual sales
in 2014, Gilenya is the highest revenue generating drug for Novartis worldwide.”).
151 Orange Book: Product Details for Gilenya (Fingolimod), FDA, http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/
scripts/cder/ob/results_product.cfm?Appl_Type=N&Appl_No=022527 (last visited Feb. 13, 2017) (listing an
approval date of Sept. 21, 2010).
152 Orange Book: Patent and Exclusivity for Gilenya (Fingolimod), FDA, http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/
scripts/cder/ob/patent_info.cfm?Product_No=001&Appl_No=022527&Appl_type=N (last visited Feb. 13,
2017).
153 Id. (expiring on Mar 29, 2026); Torrent Pharm. Ltd. v. Novartis AG, No. IPR2014-00784 (P.T.A.B.
Sept. 24, 2015).
154 Petition for Inter Partes Review, Apotex, Ltd. v. Novartis AG, No. IPR2015-00518 (P.T.A.B. Dec.
31, 2014).
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the FDA in mid-2015; Novartis subsequently brought suit in October 2015.155
Mylan joined an instituted IPR as a real party-in-interest in early 2015; that
instituted IPR had been initiated by Torrent Pharmaceuticals in a May 27,
2014, petition.156 Mylan submitted a Paragraph IV ANDA with the FDA in
early 2016 and Novartis brought suit in district court on April 22, 2016.157
The Gilenya cases illustrate that an ANDA filer can obtain a PTAB
decision, and Federal Circuit affirmance of that decision, well before the end
of the thirty-month period if it brings the IPR challenge early enough. The
thirty-month stay will expire in March 2018 in Novartis’s district court suit
against Apotex and in October 2018 in the suit against Mylan.158 The PTAB
issued a final written decision for the ‘283 patent on September 24, 2015,
finding all the claims unpatentable.159 Novartis appealed the PTAB’s decision
to the Federal Circuit, and the Federal Circuit’s disposition of the case is
expected soon.160
In the cases above, the invalidation of the ‘283 patent will not result in
earlier generic market entry because Gilenya is covered by a later-expiring
patent that is blocking generic market entry.161 Generic manufacturers will
achieve earlier market entry only by proving invalidity or noninfringement as
to the latest expiring patent, which in Gilenya’s case expires one year and three
months after the ‘283 patent.162
While the Gilenya case did not result in invalidation of the latest-expiring
patent, the next case does. It involves Novartis’s drug Exelon for treatment of

155 Complaint, Novartis AG v. Apotex Inc., No. 0:15-cv-62273-BB (S.D. Fla. Oct. 28, 2015); Complaint,
Novartis AG v. Apotex Inc., No. 1:15-cv-00975-LPS, 6 (D. Del. Oct. 26, 2015). Apotex’s notice of ANDA
filing to Novartis was dated September 14, 2015. Id.
156 Apotex, Ltd. v. Novartis AG, No. IPR2015-00518 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 17, 2015) (instituting inter partes
review and granting motion for joinder); Petition for Inter Partes Review, Torrent Pharm. Ltd. v. Novartis AG
& Mitsubishi Pharma Corp., No. IPR2014-00784 (P.T.A.B. May 27, 2014).
157 Complaint, Novartis AG v. Mylan Pharm. Inc., No. 1:16-cv-00289-UNA (D. Del. Apr. 22, 2016).
Mylan’s notice of ANDA filing to Novartis was dated April 6, 2016. Id.
158 The thirty-month stay begins on the date that the NDA holder receives notice of the Paragraph IV
certification. 21 C.F.R. § 314.107(b)(3) (2017). Apotex’s notice of ANDA filing to Novartis was dated
September 14, 2015, Complaint at 6, Novartis v. Apotex Inc., No. 0:15-cv-62273-BB, and Mylan’s notice was
dated April 6, 2016, Complaint at 6, Novartis v. Mylan Pharm. Inc., No. 1:16-cv-00289-UNA.
159 Torrent Pharm., Ltd. v. Novartis AG, No. IPR2014-00784, at 2–3 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 24, 2015).
160 Notice of Docketing, Novartis AG v. Torrent Pharm., No. 16-01352 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 21, 2015); see also
MEDIAN TIME TO DISPOSITION, supra note 148 (stating that the Federal Circuit’s median time to disposition of
cases from the Patent Office is ten months).
161 Orange Book: Patent and Exclusivity for Gilenya (Fingolimod), supra note 152.
162 Id.
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Alzheimer’s and Parkinson’s disease and illustrates that an IPR filed after
ANDA submission will likely not result in a PTAB final decision that predates
the end of the thirty-month period.
There, Noven Pharmaceuticals submitted a Paragraph IV ANDA to the
FDA in early 2013, seeking approval for a generic version of Novartis’s
Exelon.163 Novartis filed suit on April 3, 2013, after receiving Noven’s
Paragraph IV notice letter.164 Noven petitioned for IPR of the two Orange
Book-listed patents blocking approval of generic Exelon on April 2, 2014,
immediately before the one-year bar for IPR review.165 The PTAB instituted
review for both patents and issued final written decisions on September 28,
2015, finding all the challenged claims unpatentable.166 The thirty-month stay
for the district court case ended in August 2015,167 before the PTAB reached
its decision.
Noven is not alone in waiting until the deadline for the one-year bar to
petition for IPR. Many ANDA filers wait until the deadline even though earlier
filing results in earlier resolution.168 By waiting, the ANDA filer can vet the
best prior art for the IPR during discovery in the district court case.169 The
ANDA filer can also use the district court case to test out the patent owner’s
best validity arguments in response to the asserted prior art.170
Had Noven brought its IPR challenges before submitting its Paragraph IV
ANDA, it could have obtained the PTAB’s determinations of unpatentability
well before the end of the thirty-month period. That fact pattern would have

163 Press Release, Noven, Noven Confirms Filing of Abbreviated New Drug Application for Generic
Version of Exelon (Rivastigmine Transdermal System) (Apr. 3, 2013), http://www.noven.com/PR040313.php.
164 Complaint at 1, Novartis Pharm. Corp. v. Noven Pharm., Inc., No. 1:13-cv-00527-UNA (D. Del. Apr.
3, 2013).
165 Petition for Inter Partes Review, Noven Pharm., Inc., v. Novartis AG, No. IPR2014-00550 (P.T.A.B.
Apr. 2, 2014); Petition for Inter Partes Review, Noven Pharm., Inc., v. Novartis AG, No. IPR2014-00549
(P.T.A.B. Apr. 2, 2014); Orange Book: Patent and Exclusivity for Rivastigmine (Exelon) Film, Extended
Release, FDA, http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/ob/patent_info.cfm?Product_No=005&Appl_No=
022083&Appl_type=N (last visited Sept. 23, 2016) (stating that U.S. Patent Nos. 6,316,023 and 6,335,031
both expire on Jan. 8, 2019).
166 Noven Pharm., Inc., v. Novartis AG, No. IPR2014-00550, at 3 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 28, 2015); Noven
Pharm., Inc., v. Novartis AG, No. IPR2014-00549, at 3 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 28, 2015).
167 The thirty-month stay begins on the date that the NDA holder receives notice of the Paragraph IV
certification. 21 C.F.R. § 314.107(b)(3) (2016). Noven provided its Paragraph IV certification notice letter to
Novartis on February 18, 2013. Press Release, supra note 163.
168 O’Byrne, supra note 131, at 56–57.
169 Id. at 57.
170 See id.
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raised questions about the effect of the PTAB’s determination of
unpatentability on the thirty-month stay of FDA approval.
IV. NEITHER A PTAB DECISION OF UNPATENTABILITY NOR THE FEDERAL
CIRCUIT’S AFFIRMANCE OF THAT DECISION ARE SUFFICIENT TO TERMINATE
THE THIRTY-MONTH STAY OF FDA APPROVAL
Should the Federal Circuit affirm the PTAB’s decision of unpatentability
before the end of the thirty-month stay, the question arises as to whether the
stay should end before the expiry of the thirty months. Given the text of the
Hatch-Waxman Act and AIA, those circumstances alone cannot prematurely
terminate the thirty-month stay, as shown in section A of this Part. An
examination of the legislative history produces the same conclusion, as
demonstrated in section B.
A. Statutory Text of the Hatch-Waxman Act and AIA Does Not Permit a PTAB
Decision Affirmed by the Federal Circuit to Terminate the Thirty-Month
Stay
Starting with an analysis of the plain text,171 the language of the HatchWaxman and AIA statutes clearly does not tie termination of the thirty-month
stay to a PTAB decision of unpatentability, even after that decision has been
affirmed by the Federal Circuit. Neither statute indicates that such events can
trigger termination of the thirty-month stay. In light of the clear statutory text,
the courts and FDA should “resist reading . . . elements into a statute that do
not appear on its face.”172
The thirty-month stay provisions in the Hatch-Waxman Act have plain
meaning173 and do not provide that a PTAB decision, even when affirmed by
the Federal Circuit, can terminate the thirty-month stay. The statutory language
explicitly lays out the specific circumstances in which termination can

171 S. Cal. Edison Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 195 F.3d 17, 23 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (“[T]he
starting point, and the most traditional tool of statutory construction, is to read the text itself.”).
172 Bates v. United States, 522 U.S. 23, 29 (1997); see also United States v. Goldenberg, 168 U.S. 95, 103
(1897) (“No mere omission . . . which it may seem wise to have specifically provided for, justif[ies] any
judicial addition to the language of the statute.”); Nat’l Women, Infants, & Children Grocers Ass’n v. Food &
Nutrition Serv., 416 F. Supp. 2d 92, 100 (D.D.C. 2006) (stating that a court will not read into a section what is
not stated therein nor ignore its plain language).
173 Sanofi-Aventis v. FDA, 725 F. Supp. 2d 92, 100 (D.D.C. 2010).
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occur.174 It provides that where an ANDA otherwise meets the standards for
approval, it shall “be made effective upon the expiration of the thirty-month
period . . . except” in a series of specific circumstances that do not include a
PTAB decision of unpatentability.175 Courts have cautioned that “[w]here
[Congress] has acted to except certain categories from the operation of a
particular law, it is to be presumed that [Congress] in its exceptions intended to
go only as far as it did, and that additional exceptions are not warranted.”176
Courts have adhered to this principle in strictly construing the thirty-month
stay provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act.177
The Hatch-Waxman Act expressly states that the stay-terminating event
must originate from a district court action. The thirty-month stay ends if a
“district court decides that the patent is invalid or not infringed.”178 The stay
will be lifted upon the entry of judgment by the district court, regardless of any
subsequent appeal.179 The stay can also end if the ANDA filer loses in the
district court but wins on appeal.180 If “the district court decides that the patent
174

Endo Pharm. Inc. v. Mylan Techs. Inc., No. 11-220-GMS, 2013 WL 936452, at *5 (D. Del. Mar. 11,
2013) (explaining that the statutory language explicitly provides that termination of the thirty-month stay will
occur only in certain prescribed ways).
175 See 35 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(C) (2012) (emphasis added).
176 See, e.g., Sierra Club v. EPA, 719 F.2d 436, 453 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (quoting Colo. Public Interest
Research Grp., Inc. v. Train, 507 F.2d 743, 747 (10th Cir. 1974)).
177 Courts have strictly construed the thirty-month stay provision for the reason that the “statutory
language explicitly provides the prescribed ways in which termination can occur.” Endo Pharm. Inc., 2013
WL 936452, at *5 (declining to find that a dismissal order ends the thirty-month stay); see also Merck & Co.
v. Apotex, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 2d 418, 427–28, 430 (D. Del. 2007), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 287 F. App’x
884 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (declining to opine whether a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction would lift
the thirty-month stay, but stating that “the court cannot remedy every harm or prejudice a party endures” from
actions that are “expressly sanctioned by the Hatch-Waxman” Act); Sanofi-Aventis, 725 F. Supp. 2d at 100
(holding that the plain language of the Hatch-Waxman Act dictates that the thirty-month stay terminates upon
the entry of judgment by a district court that a patent is invalid or not infringed, regardless of any subsequent
appeal).
178 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(c)(3)(C)(i)(I), (j)(5)(B)(iii)(I)(aa) (emphasis added); see also 21 C.F.R.
§ 314.107(b)(3)(B)(ii) (2017). A “substantive determination that there is no cause of action for patent
infringement or invalidity” is a decision directed at the merits. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(I)(aa).
179 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(c)(3)(C)(i)(I), (j)(5)(B)(iii)(I)(aa). The thirty-month stay terminates upon the entry of
judgment by a district court that a patent is invalid or not infringed, regardless of any subsequent appeal.
Sanofi-Aventis, 725 F. Supp. 2d at 100. The Sanofi court stated that “the court” in this provision plainly refers
only to a district court and the “date on which the court enters judgment” refers to a “specific, unambiguous
event described in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58.” Id. at 98; see also 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(c)(3)(C)(i)(I),
(j)(5)(B)(iii)(I)(aa); FED. R. CIV. P. 58.
180 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(c)(3)(C)(ii), (j)(5)(B)(iii)(II) (“[I]f before expiration of [the thirty-month] period the
district court decides that the patent has been infringed—if the judgment of the district court is appealed, the
approval shall be made effective on—the date on which the court of appeals decides that the patent is invalid
or not infringed.” (emphasis added)); KENNETH L. DORSNEY, ANDA LITIGATION: STRATEGIES AND TACTICS
FOR PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT LITIGATORS 63 (2012).
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has been infringed” and “the judgment of the district court is appealed,” then
the thirty-month stay will be lifted when the “court of appeals decides that the
patent is invalid or not infringed.”181
A PTAB decision, even if affirmed by the Federal Circuit, does not fall
within the specific circumstances set out in these provisions because the PTAB
is not a district court. Under a plain reading of the statute, invalidation by the
PTAB does not enable the FDA to lift the thirty-month stay and immediately
approve the ANDA.182
Similarly, the plain text of the AIA does not support an interpretation that
an IPR or PGR can terminate the thirty-month stay. The statutory language is
silent as to this issue and does not give any indication that patent resolution at
the PTAB can terminate the thirty-month stay. 183
When viewed in context of all the provisions in the AIA, the omission is
glaring. Two other provisions, though not directly related to IPRs or PGRs,
specifically reference litigation pursuant to the Hatch-Waxman Act; AIA § 12
refers to the Paragraph IV notice letter, and AIA § 19 governs the
consolidation of overlapping Hatch-Waxman claims against different ANDA
filers.184 The Russello canon of construction provides that, “where Congress
includes particular language in one section . . . but omits it in another section
of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress act[ed]
intentionally . . . in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.”185 The omission
181

21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(II).
See Sturiale, supra note 5, at 5, 42–43.
183 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
184 35 U.S.C. § 257(c)(2)(A) (2012) (“Paragraph (1) shall not apply to . . . a notice received by the patent
owner under section 505(j)(2)(B)(iv)(II) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act . . .”). Section
505(j)(2)(B)(iv)(II) provides that an ANDA “applicant that makes a [Paragraph IV] certification . . . shall
include in the application a statement that the applicant will give notice as required . . . .” 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(j)(2)(B)(i); 35 U.S.C. § 299(a) (2012) (showing that new joinder rules do not apply to “an action or trial
in which an act of infringement under section 271(e)(2) has been pled”); see also 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) (2012)
(“It shall be an act of infringement to submit—an application under section 505(j) of the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act . . . for a drug claimed in a patent or the use of which is claimed in a patent.”).
185 Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (quoting United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d
720, 722 (5th Cir. 1972)). The Supreme Court has applied the Russello canon of construction to infer
congressional intent when one section of an Act lacks specific language contained in a different section of the
same Act. See, e.g., Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 452–53 (2002); United States v. Gonzales,
520 U.S. 1, 5 (1997); Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 512 (1981). The Federal Circuit and D.C.
Circuit regularly apply the Russello canon of construction. See, e.g., Texas v. EPA, 726 F.3d 180, 188 (D.C.
Cir. 2013); Burden v. Shinseki, 727 F.3d 1161, 1171 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Sioux Honey Ass’n v. Hartford Fire
Ins., 672 F.3d 1041, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (concluding that “Congress’s use of the term ‘jurisdiction’ in [28
U.S.C.] §§ 1581–1584 but not in § 1585 suggests that it did not intend for . . . the concept of supplemental
182
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could suggest that Congress intended the thirty-month stay to continue after the
PTAB decision of unpatentability and the Federal Circuit affirmance of that
decision.
B. Congressional Intent Indicates that PTAB Decisions Cannot Terminate the
Thirty-Month Stay
If the statutory language is clear as to the scope of the thirty-month stay
provisions, the courts and FDA ordinarily “will not inquire further.”186 An
inquiry into Congressional intent is necessary only to determine whether there
is “a clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary.”187 Here, the backdrop
against which Congress legislated indicates an intent to exclude PTAB
proceedings from the types of events that can terminate the thirty-month stay.
When Congress enacted the Hatch-Waxman Act in 1984, a party could
challenge patent validity at the USPTO in a type of post-grant proceeding: the
ex parte reexamination.188 An ex parte reexamination could be finalized before
the end of the thirty-month stay if initiated well before the Hatch-Waxman
litigation. Yet Congress did not mention the ex parte reexamination in the
Hatch-Waxman statute in 1984.189 In the House Report on the Hatch-Waxman
Act, the Committee on Commerce stated its intent to tie early termination of
the thirty-month stay to a district court decision.190
jurisdiction” to apply to § 1585); Ford v. Mabus, 629 F.3d 198, 206 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“[I]t is through the ‘dint
of . . . phrasing’ that Congress speaks, and where it uses different language in different provisions of the same
statute, we must give effect to those differences.”). However, the Supreme Court has indicated that the
Russello canon must be considered in light of “the design of the statute” as a whole and “its object and policy,”
Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 519 (2009) (quoting Dada v. Mukasey, 554 U.S. 1, 16 (2008)), and has
cautioned against the use of the Russello canon where there are an increasing number of differences between
the provisions being compared, see City of Columbus v. Ours Garage and Wrecker Serv., 536 U.S. 424, 435–
36 (2002).
186 Lin Qi–Zhuo v. Meissner, 70 F.3d 136, 140 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding that if the plain language of the
statute is clear, the court need not inquire further into its meaning, at least in the absence of “a clearly
expressed legislative intent to the contrary” (quoting Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 177 (1993))).
187 Id.
188 35 U.S.C. §§ 301–307 (2012). Ex parte reexamination historical statistics show seventy-eight filed in
1981, 187 filed in 1982, and 186 filed in 1983. USPTO, EX PARTE REEXAMINATION FILING DATA—
SEPTEMBER 30, 2014 (Sept. 30, 2014), http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ex_parte_historical_
stats_roll_up_EOY2014.pdf [hereinafter USPTO EX PARTE REEXAMINATION FILING DATA].
189 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585
(1984).
190 The House Report on the Hatch-Waxman Act states that the “Committee recognizes that some
ANDA’s will be submitted and ready for approval before the patent on the listed drug has expired.” H.R. REP.
NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 27 (1984). “[A]pproval of the ANDA may not be made effective until [the end of the stay]
unless a district court has decided a case for patent infringement earlier.” Id. (emphasis added).
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In 2003, when Congress amended the Hatch-Waxman Act, another type of
post-grant proceeding was available to patent challengers: the inter partes
reexamination.191 An inter partes reexamination could have been finalized
before the end of the thirty-month period if initiated early. In 2003 alone, the
USPTO received 392 requests for ex parte reexamination and twenty-one
requests for inter partes reexamination.192 Yet Congress did not provide for
either type of proceeding in the Hatch-Waxman amendments of 2003.193 To
the contrary, Congress amended the statutory language to clarify that the stay
can end only after a district court action. The amendment specified that the
court that “decides that such patent is invalid or not infringed” must be a
district court.194
The legislative history indicates the thirty-month stay provisions were a
“hard-won compromise” that should be construed narrowly.195 The existence
of the regulatory stay and its length were the result of hard-won compromises
between members of Congress, the pioneer drug developers, and the generic
drug industry. The stay was added “to accommodate the competing concerns”
of the brand-name and generic industries, according to the House Report.196
And even though the addition of the stay was against the generic
manufacturers’ interests, they “were willing to live with [the statutory stay]
because of other provisions in the bill.”197 Members of Congress engaged in
heated debate over the length of the stay.198 The length was revised numerous

191

35 U.S.C. §§ 311–319 (2012) (effective Nov. 1999).
USPTO EX PARTE REEXAMINATION FILING DATA, supra note 188; USPTO, INTER PARTES
REEXAMINATION FILING DATA—SEPTEMBER 30, 2014 (Sept. 30, 2014), http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/
files/documents/inter_parte_historical_stats_roll_up_EOY2014.pdf.
193 Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117
Stat. 2066 (2003); Optional Inter Partes Reexamination Procedure Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat.
1501 (1999) (codified as 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–319 (2012)).
194 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(c)(3)(C)(i), (j)(5)(B)(iii)(I) (2012) (emphasis added). The Medicare Prescription
Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 amended the Hatch-Waxman Act to specify that the
thirty-month stay will be terminated by a decision of invalidity or noninfringement by a district court or by a
court of appeals after appeal from a district court case. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and
Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2450, 2454 (2003) (codified as 21 U.S.C.
§§ 355(c)(3)(C)(i), (j)(5)(B)(iii)(I)). As originally enacted, the Hatch-Waxman Act provided that the thirtymonth stay terminates if “the court decides that such patent is invalid or not infringed.” Drug Price
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585, 1589, 1595 (1984)
(emphasis added).
195 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 557 F.3d 1346, 1354 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (Prost, J.,
dissenting).
196 See H.R. REP. NO. 98-857 pt. 2, at 9–10 (1984).
197 Id.
198 Eli Lilly, 557 F.3d at 1354 n.3; 130 CONG. REC. H24426–31 (Sept. 6, 1984).
192
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times during the legislative process, from eighteen months in the House’s
version of the Act to thirty months in the Senate’s.199 Given this legislative
history, courts should properly read the thirty-month stay provisions to cover
only the “narrow circumstances described in the statute.”200 Otherwise, the
compromise that created the thirty-month stay provisions will “cease[] to have
meaning.”201
Further, Congress has carefully balanced the incentives for pharmaceutical
innovation with increasing patient access to generic drugs.202 That balance is
“quintessentially a matter for legislative judgment.”203 Because Congress has
already articulated its legislative judgment, the courts “must attend closely to
[those] terms.”204
When Congress enacted the AIA in 2011,205 Hatch-Waxman litigations
were common and had been around since the 1980s.206 Congress presumably
legislated with the awareness that the new IPR and PGR proceedings would be
used with respect to Orange Book-listed patents. It was within Congress’s
purview to integrate the thirty-month stay into the statutory framework for
IPRs and PGRs, but Congress did not. The omission might alternatively have
been an oversight by Congress in a complex area of law. Nonetheless, the
courts and FDA should narrowly construe the thirty-month stay provisions
given the powerful textual arguments available.207
V. ANDA APPROVAL UPON PREVAILING AT THE PTAB
AND FEDERAL CIRCUIT
Section A of this Part examines how the thirty-month stay may be
terminated after an ANDA filer prevails at the PTAB and Federal Circuit.
These pathways for terminating the stay involve unnecessary delays in ANDA
approval and require the ANDA filer to navigate through complex maneuvers.
The result is to delay generic market entry and patient access to lower-priced

199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206

H.R. 3605, 98th Cong. § 101 (1984); S. 2926, 98th Cong. § 101 (1984).
Eli Lilly, 557 F.3d at 1354 n.3.
Id.
Teva Pharm. Indus. v. Crawford, 410 F.3d 51, 54 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Shepherd, supra note 1, at 22.
Teva Pharm. Indus., 410 F.3d at 54.
Id.
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585

(1984).
207

Apel, supra note 5, at 129.
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generic drugs. To mitigate this problem, section B of this Part proposes a
statutory amendment to integrate IPRs and PGRs into the Hatch-Waxman
framework.
A. Pathways for Terminating the Thirty-Month Stay
The Hatch-Waxman Act delineates specific circumstances that can end the
thirty-month stay, and the FDA permits certain extra-statutory triggers to
automatically terminate the stay. Currently, resolution of patent validity at the
PTAB and Federal Circuit does not automatically terminate the thirty-month
stay.
1. Stay-Terminating Triggers Expressly Recognized by Statute
The Hatch-Waxman Act expressly delineates triggers that can terminate the
stay of FDA approval before the end of the thirty-month period. The thirtymonth stay terminates if, in a district court proceeding, the ANDA filer
establishes “that the patent is invalid or not infringed (including any
substantive determination that there is no cause of action for patent
infringement or invalidity).”208 If the ANDA filer loses in the district court, the
thirty-month stay can still end if on appeal, the “court of appeals decides that
the patent is invalid or not infringed (including any substantive determination
that there is no cause of action for patent infringement or invalidity).”209
Under these statutory provisions, an ANDA filer who prevails at the PTAB
and the Federal Circuit before the end of the thirty-month period has two
pathways for effecting termination of the stay. The ANDA filer may have a
district court take judicial notice of the PTAB and Federal Circuit’s decisions
of invalidity.210 The second way is to obtain a settlement order or consent
decree from a federal court certifying that the patents-at-issue are invalid,
unenforceable, or not infringed.211
The first way of effecting termination requires a decision from the PTAB,
affirmed by the Federal Circuit, that the relevant Orange Book-listed patents
are unpatentable. Assuming the ANDA filer is engaged in parallel litigation
before a district court, once the ANDA filer succeeds at the PTAB and Federal

208
209
210
211

21 U.S.C. §§ 355(c)(3)(C)(i), (j)(5)(B)(iii)(I) (2012); see also 21 C.F.R. § 314.107(b)(3)(ii) (2017).
21 U.S.C. §§ 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(II); see also 21 C.F.R. § 314.107(b)(3)(iii).
Sturiale, supra note 5, at 26.
21 C.F.R. § 314.107(b)(3).
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Circuit, it will ask the district court to take judicial notice of the Federal
Circuit’s decision. The district court is bound to the PTAB’s decision so long
as the case in the district court has not been finally decided.212 Upon
affirmance of the PTAB’s decision, the USPTO will cancel the relevant claims,
which has the effect of extinguishing the patent owner’s patent rights.213
Therefore, the district court should enter judgment that the asserted claims are
invalid,214 which under the statute is a decision by “the district court . . . that
the patent is invalid” and that terminates the thirty-month stay.215
The ANDA filer must navigate through a series of complex maneuvers
because the stay does not automatically terminate upon patent resolution at the
PTAB and Federal Circuit.216 Requiring the ANDA filer “to navigate these
maneuvers is terribly inefficient” and “only delays [market] entry by generic
drug manufacturers.”217
The stay could also end prematurely if the parties to a district court
proceeding enter a settlement order certifying that the patent claims are invalid
or not infringed,218 which is a “substantive determination that there is no cause
of action for patent infringement or invalidity.”219 The patent owner might
agree to such a settlement order if there is a separate appeal that will decide the
validity of the asserted claims. Those circumstances occurred in Cubist
Pharmaceuticals’ ANDA suits for infringement of patents covering its
antibiotic product. Cubist sued two separate ANDA filers Mylan and Hospira
for infringement of the same patent claims. The Hospira appeal reached the
Federal Circuit before resolution between Cubist and Mylan in district court.
212 Jonathan Tamimi, Breaking Bad Patents: The Formula for Quick, Inexpensive Resolution of Patent
Validity, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 587, 613 (2014); see Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 721 F.3d
1330, 1339–40 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“[C]ancellation of claims during reexamination would be binding in
concurrent infringement litigation.”).
213 35 U.S.C. § 328(b) (2012); Gugliuzza, supra note 102, at 312; see also ePlus, Inc. v. Lawson Software,
Inc., 760 F.3d 1350, 1356–57 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (discussing the USPTO’s decision of unpatentability, its
cancellation of the relevant claim, and the removal of the rights previously conferred by that claim), amended
by 789 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
214 Gugliuzza, supra note 102, at 312; Sturiale, supra note 5, at 42; see also FED. R. EVID. 201(b)(2) (“The
court may judicially notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it can be accurately and
readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.”).
215 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(c)(3)(C)(i), (j)(5)(B)(iii)(I) (2012).
216 Sturiale, supra note 5, at 42–43; see supra notes 212–16.
217 Sturiale, supra note 5, at 43.
218 Abbreviated New Drug Applications and 505(b)(2) Applications, 80 Fed. Reg. 6802, 6863 (Feb. 6,
2015); Hovenkamp, supra note 48, at 11.
219 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii); see Abbreviated New Drug Applications and 505(b)(2) Applications, 80
Fed. Reg. at 6863.
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Therefore, Cubist and Mylan stipulated in the district court proceeding that the
asserted claims are invalid in light of the Federal Circuit’s decision in the
Hospira appeal.220 The Federal Circuit ultimately invalidated Cubists’ asserted
claims in the Hospira appeal and the Mylan district court entered a consent
judgment certifying that the claims are invalid.221
2. Extra-Statutory Triggers that Prematurely Terminate the Thirty-Month
Stay
A number of events that are not delineated in the Hatch-Waxman
provisions can trigger termination of the thirty-month stay.222 The fact that the
FDA allows for extra-statutory triggers suggests that it might agree to dissolve
the thirty-month stay for an ANDA filer who prevails at the PTAB and Federal
Circuit. The FDA’s view on this issue is not known because it has not yet been
presented with it. However, if the FDA were to dissolve the thirty-month stay
under these circumstances, it would be acting outside its authority.
The FDA will prematurely terminate the thirty-month stay in three types of
extra-statutory scenarios,223 the latter two of which are arguably outside the
FDA’s authority. Under the first scenario, the FDA will terminate the stay if
the patent owner agrees to ANDA approval. In some settlements, the patent
owner might grant a license to the ANDA filer and agree to ANDA
approval.224 Because the FDA will “permit termination of the 30-month
stay . . . without a court order,” the FDA’s practice is not authorized by the
Hatch-Waxman provisions, which expressly require a court’s determination of
infringement or invalidity.225 Nevertheless, the FDA possesses the authority to
terminate the thirty-month stay under these circumstances. The patent owner is
“granted a statutory benefit or right” in the thirty-month stay and may “waive
220

Cubist Pharm. LLC v. Mylan Labs. Ltd., Case 1:13-cv-01679-GMS, slip op. at 1 (Fed. Cir. May 24,
2016); see also Hovenkamp, supra note 48, at 21.
221 Cubist Pharm. LLC v. Mylan Labs. Ltd., Case 1:13-cv-01679-GMS (D. Del. Feb. 2, 2016).
222 See Abbreviated New Drug Applications and 505(b)(2) Applications, 81 Fed. Reg. 69,580, 69,582
(Oct. 6, 2016) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 314, 320) (“addressing other scenarios in which a 30-month stay may
be terminated”).
223 See id. (“[W]ritten consent to approval by the patent owner or exclusive patent licensee, a court order
terminating the stay, or a court order of dismissal without a finding of infringement.”).
224 See also Abbreviated New Drug Applications and 505(b)(2) Applications, 81 Fed. Reg. at 69,626–27
(“Written consent to approval by patent owner . . . if the patent owner . . . agreed in writing that the . . . ANDA
may be approved, the 30-month stay . . . would be terminated and the approval may be granted on or after the
date of the consent.”); Hovenkamp, supra note 48, at 11.
225 Abbreviated New Drug Applications and 505(b)(2) Applications, 80 Fed. Reg. 6802, 6864 (Feb. 6,
2015); see also 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2012).
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that benefit or right.”226 Once the patent owner consents to ANDA approval,
there is no longer infringement under the patent statute and no longer a basis
for the infringement action.227
Under the other two extra-statutory triggers, the FDA will terminate the
thirty-month stay if a court order requires termination or if a court dismisses
the ANDA suit without a finding of invalidity or noninfringement.228 These
extra-statutory triggers are arguably outside the authority of the courts and
FDA to carry out.
The courts lack the statutory authority to terminate the thirty-month stay
unless “either party . . . [has] failed to reasonably cooperate in expediting the
action.”229 The Hatch-Waxman statute recognizes that only in those
circumstances may a district court shorten the thirty-month stay. By
circumventing the language of the statute, a court would be exceeding its
authority.230 The Federal Circuit has narrowly construed the thirty-month stay
provisions to permit termination only when expressly authorized by statute.231
It has narrowly construed the failure to “reasonably cooperate in expediting the
action” provision to exclude scenarios such as improper conduct before the
FDA or delaying resolution of the overall patent dispute.232 A counterargument
might stress the federal courts’ inherent authority “to manage their own
affairs,” which presumably could extend to the thirty-month stay.233 That
226

Kirkland & Ellis LLP, Comment on the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) Proposed Rule:
Abbreviated New Drug Applications and 505(b)(2) Applications (July 7, 2015), https://www.regulations.gov/
document?D=FDA-2011-N-0830-0010; see also Abbreviated New Drug Applications and 505(b)(2)
Applications, 81 Fed. Reg. at 69,626–27 (“[T]his provision . . . permits the party that receives the benefit of
the statutory 30-month stay to waive that benefit.”).
227 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012) (the manufacture or sale of a patented article “without authority” is an
infringement); Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Impression Prods., Inc., 816 F.3d 721, 733 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(“[I]nfringement . . . mean[s] what § 271 came to say—committing the identified acts without authority
(synonymously, without consent or permission) . . . .”).
228 Abbreviated New Drug Applications and 505(b)(2) Applications, 81 Fed. Reg. at 69,627.
229 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii); Sturiale, supra note 5, at 36.
230 Sturiale, supra note 5, at 36.
231 See, e.g., Andrx Pharm., Inc. v. Biovail Corp., 276 F.3d 1368, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“We find no such
authority in the statute . . . . Thus, the district court exceeded its authority in shortening the thirty-month stay.”)
232 Id. at 1376.
233 See, e.g., Dietz v. Bouldin, 136 S. Ct. 1885, 1891 (2016) (“[T]his Court has long recognized that a
district court possesses inherent powers that are ‘governed not by rule or statute but by the control necessarily
vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of
cases.’”); Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Mallinckrodt Inc., No. 06 Civ. 13095, 2007 WL 1437742, at *2–4 (S.D.N.Y.
May 15, 2007) (describing that the drug developer “move[d] this Court . . . to invoke its inherent powers to
issue a thirty-month stay” and “ask[ed] that its motion be granted pursuant to the Court’s ‘inherent authority’
over the thirty-month stay provision”).
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argument fails to appreciate that the thirty-month stay is imposed by statute,
rather than by the courts.234 Therefore the courts likely have no inherent
authority over the thirty-month stay.235
The third extra-statutory trigger occurs once a district court dismisses the
ANDA suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; the FDA will then terminate
the thirty-month stay even though the statutory prerequisite for a finding of
noninfringement or invalidity is lacking.236 The FDA acknowledges that “this
issue was not addressed by Congress”; the Hatch-Waxman statute permit
termination of the stay after a district court enters an “order of dismissal
without a finding of infringement.”237 But according to the FDA, termination is
justified “because it avoid[s] unwarranted delays in approval of . . . [an]
ANDA while protecting innovator intellectual property rights.”238
The FDA’s extra-statutory practices suggest that it might agree to dissolve
the stay before the end of the thirty-month period for an ANDA filer who
prevails at the PTAB. The ANDA filer would petition the FDA to dissolve the
stay after obtaining a determination from the PTAB that the relevant Orange
Book-listed patents are unpatentable. The FDA might dissolve the stay after
the Federal Circuit affirms the PTAB and issues a formal mandate. The formal
mandate officially closes the case under the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction and
allows time for the patent owner to exhaust its right to be reheard by that
court.239 Permitting those circumstances to terminate the thirty-month stay
would further the FDA’s express policy goals of preventing delays in generic
drug approval and allowing the patent owner to assert its rights before generic
entry.240

234

See Sturiale, supra note 5, at 36.
See id.
236 Abbreviated New Drug Applications and 505(b)(2) Applications, 81 Fed. Reg. at 69,627 (“[A] Federal
district court’s entry of an order of dismissal . . . of patent infringement . . . will terminate the 30-month stay
period . . . .”); see, e.g., Merck & Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 287 F. App’x 884, 887 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (explaining how
FDA dissolved the thirty-month stay once the district court dismissed the case for lack of Article III
jurisdiction).
237 Abbreviated New Drug Applications and 505(b)(2) Applications, 81 Fed. Reg. at 69,627; see also
Abbreviated New Drug Applications and 505(b)(2) Applications, 80 Fed. Reg. at 6864 (“[T]he statute does not
address whether a 30-month stay may be terminated and . . . [an] ANDA approved if the court enters an order
of dismissal without a finding of patent infringement . . . .”).
238 Abbreviated New Drug Applications and 505(b)(2) Applications, 81 Fed. Reg. at 69,627.
239 See FED. R. APP. P. 41.
240 The FDA’s policies are “intended to avoid unnecessary delays in approval of generic drugs” and allow
the patent owner to assert its rights before generic entry. Abbreviated New Drug Applications and 505(b)(2)
Applications, 80 Fed. Reg. at 6805. The FDA “recognizes that a party may request rehearing by the appellate
235
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The ANDA filer might argue that an appeal from the PTAB should be no
different from an appeal from the district court. For appeals from district court
decisions, the FDA will approve the ANDA once the Federal Circuit issues a
mandate “entering judgment that the patent is invalid, unenforceable, or not
infringed”; the FDA should follow this same practice for PTAB appeals.241
Further, the Federal Circuit affirmance of an invalidity judgment is
functionally the same regardless of whether the judgment was made by the
district court or PTAB because both result in extinguishing the relevant patent
rights.242
Though the FDA has good policy reasons for adopting extra-statutory
exceptions to the thirty-month stay provisions, it is outside the FDA’s authority
to do so. Agencies have no freestanding authority “to ‘correct’ the text [of a
statute] so that it better serves the statute’s purposes . . . [or because] its
preferred approach would be a better policy.”243 Congress expressly set forth
the bases for dissolving the thirty-month stay in the Hatch-Waxman Act, and
later in the 2003 Amendments to the Hatch-Waxman Act.244 The HatchWaxman provisions impose the thirty-month stay unless specific, express
exceptions are met.245 Those express exceptions preclude the FDA from
adopting new, extra-statutory exceptions.246
Regardless of the FDA’s ultimate decision on this issue, any party who
challenges it in court will likely lose. The pharmaceutical industry is a highly

panel or rehearing en banc. . . . [I]t would be premature to terminate the thirty-month stay . . . while a decision
regarding patent noninfringement, invalidity, or unenforceability was being reheard.” Id. at 6863–64.
241 21 C.F.R. § 314.107(b)(3)(iii)(A) (2017) (“If before the expiration of the 30-month period . . . the
district court decides that the patent has been infringed, and if the judgment of the district court is appealed,
the . . . ANDA may be approved on . . . [t]he date on which the mandate is issued by the court of appeals
entering judgment that the patent is invalid, unenforceable, or not infringed . . . .”).
242 35 U.S.C. §§ 318(b), 328(b) (2012) (showing that the USPTO cancels claims after the time for appeal
has passed or after the Federal Circuit affirms the PTAB’s decision); Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of
Illinois Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971) (once a court invalidates a patent, future defendants may rely on the
previous judgment of invalidity under the doctrine of issue preclusion); Mendenhall v. Barber-Greene Co., 26
F.3d 1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1994), as corrected on reh’g (Sept. 14, 1994).
243 Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 88 F.3d 1075, 1089 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
244 See supra notes 174–81, 191–94 and accompanying text; Abbreviated New Drug Applications and
505(b)(2) Applications, 81 Fed. Reg. at 69,580.
245 See supra notes 174–77 and accompanying text.
246 The doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius precludes the courts and FDA from creating extrastatutory exceptions. See, e.g., POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 134 S. Ct. 2228, 2238 (2014) (“By
taking care to mandate express pre-emption of some state laws, Congress if anything indicated it did not intend
the FDCA to preclude requirements arising from other sources.”).
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regulated industry, and the courts usually defer to the FDA in such contexts.247
A party who challenges the FDA’s decision would face a formidable obstacle
if the reviewing court affords the FDA Chevron deference.248 Under the
Chevron analysis, Congress has not directly spoken to the precise question of
whether a PTAB decision can terminate the thirty-month stay.249 The party
would face the challenge of proving that the FDA’s decision is “arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the
law.”250
As illustrated in the preceding section, the pathways for terminating the
thirty-month stay involve unnecessary delays. The drug developer’s patent
rights are extinguished once the ANDA filer prevails at the PTAB and the
Federal Circuit.251 Yet, the Hatch-Waxman statute does not permit automatic
termination of the thirty-month stay in those circumstances.252 This Comment
therefore proposes an amendment to the Hatch-Waxman statute.
B. Statutory Amendment to Integrate IPRs and PGRs into the Thirty-Month
Stay Provisions
Congress last amended the Hatch-Waxman Act in 2003.253 In the last four
or so years, the AIA has dramatically changed the patent landscape, more so
than since the Patent Act of 1952.254 Using IPRs in ANDA litigation has raised
unanticipated questions and created significant uncertainty in pharmaceutical

247 Apel, supra note 5, at 132; see also Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 842–44 (1984).
248 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43 (“When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which it
administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly
spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the
court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. . . . [I]f the
statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the
agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”).
249 See 35 U.S.C. § 355(j)(B)(iii)(I); see also Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Thompson, 389 F.3d 1272, 1279 (D.C.
Cir. 2004) (applying Chevron, rather than Skidmore, deference to the FDA’s application of the Hatch-Waxman
provisions).
250 Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Thompson, 332 F. Supp. 2d 106, 117 (D.D.C.), aff’d, 389 F.3d 1272 (D.C. Cir.
2004).
251 See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
252 See supra notes 212–17 and accompanying text.
253 Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108–173,
§ 1102(a), 117 Stat. 2066, 2457–60 (2003) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2012)).
254 See Wayne C. Jaeschke, Zhun Lu & Paul Crawford, Comparison of Chinese and U.S. Patent Reform
Legislation: Which, If Either, Got It Right?, 11 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 567, 573 (2012).
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patent rights.255 Congress should amend the Hatch-Waxman Act to clarify the
interplay between IPRs and ANDA litigation, especially as the number of IPR
challenges to Orange Book-listed patents continues to increase.256 Specifically,
Congress should tie termination of the thirty-month stay to patent resolution at
the PTAB and Federal Circuit. This amendment would to improve
administrative efficiency and patient access to generic drugs.
Given that IPRs and PGRs will become an integral part of ANDA
litigation,257 Congress should revisit Hatch-Waxman to integrate IPRs and
PGRs into the statutory framework and resolve questions raised by the use of
IPRs in ANDA litigation.258 Congress may use this opportunity to assess
whether there is a proper balance between stimulating drug innovation and
encouraging generic entry.259 Some commentators argue that amending the
statutory scheme is unnecessary due to lack of evidence of systematic failure
and uncertainty about the effects of IPRs on pharmaceutical innovation.260 Yet,
the number of IPRs on Orange Book-listed patents continues to increase, even
if not yet occurring in large numbers.261 In 2015, there were twice as many IPR
petitions filed on Orange Book-listed patents compared to 2014, and the
number likely increased again in 2016.262
Further, Congress needs to provide clarity to the regulated entities, the
agencies and the courts. For the regulated entities, greater certainty encourages
business investments, reduces unnecessary litigation, and facilitates

255

See, e.g., Shepherd, supra note 1, at 17.
Id. at 25–26.
257 See, e.g., American Conference Inst., Paragraph IV Disputes: Expert Insights on Hatch-Waxman
Litigation Strategies for Brand Names and Generics 5, http://www2.americanconference.com/content/
download-content/pdf/marketing/688L15_12pager_E.pdf?sp (last visited Mar. 2, 2017).
258 Shepherd, supra note 1, at 25–26; Abbreviated New Drug Applications and 505(b)(2) Applications, 80
Fed. Reg. at 6805 (“[The FDA regulations] preserve the balance struck in the Drug Price Competition and
Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984.” (citation omitted)); see also Apel, supra note 5, at 110 (noting that the
AIA does not address this question: “Can a party that prevails in [an IPR or PGR] trigger the failure to market
provision in the Hatch-Waxman Act, thereby unparking the first filer’s exclusivity?”); Sturiale, supra note 5,
at 40 (noting that currently only the first filer is awarded the 180-day exclusivity, even if a subsequent filer
invalidates the patent blocking generic entry at the PTAB).
259 Some commentators have raised concerns that IPRs disrupt the balance that the Hatch-Waxman Act
sought to strike between medical innovation and patient access. See, e.g., Shepherd, supra note 1, at 26; Letter
from Arti K. Rai & Jacob S. Sherkow to U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary (June 18, 2015).
260 See, e.g., Letter, supra note 259; Noonan, supra note 95.
261 Shepherd, supra note 1, at 25–26.
262 Id. Note that the statistics for the number of IPR petitions filed on Orange Book-listed patents in 2016
are unavailable at the time of this writing.
256
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compliance.263 Legal certainty also improves administrative efficiency and
facilitates enforcement by the agencies and courts.264
In amending the statute, Congress should tie termination of the thirtymonth stay to patent resolution at the PTAB and Federal Circuit. The statutory
amendment should streamline IPRs and PGRs into ANDA litigation by
requiring stay dissolution once the Federal Circuit affirms the PTAB and issues
a formal mandate.
This proposed amendment is a modest change, but it is a good step toward
improving access to lower-cost generic drugs.265 This improvement furthers
the goals of the Hatch-Waxman Act by ensuring that invalid patents do not
impede generic market entry.266 It reduces unnecessary delays in FDA
approval of otherwise approvable ANDAs,267 which in turn, accelerates
generic market entry, creates competition in the drug market, reduces prices,
and increases access to drugs.268
This proposal also ensures fairness to the patent owner and comports with
the Hatch-Waxman Act’s goal of preserving the pioneer’s patent incentives.269
By tying stay dissolution to the appellate mandate, the proposed amendment
preserves the drug developer’s right to request rehearing at the Federal
Circuit.270 The statutory purpose of the thirty-month stay is to provide the drug
developer with adequate time to assert its patent rights against accused
infringers.271 But once the Federal Circuit affirms the PTAB and issues the
mandate, the USPTO is required to cancel the relevant claims, which has the

263 Abbreviated New Drug Applications and 505(b)(2) Applications, 81 Fed. Reg. at 69,580 (“[The FDA]
intend[s] to reduce unnecessary litigation . . . and provide business certainty to both brand name and generic
drug manufacturers.”).
264 Id.
265 Cf. Apel, supra note 5, at 134; Abbreviated New Drug Applications and 505(b)(2) Applications, 81
Fed. Reg. at 69,580 (The 2003 amendments to the Hatch-Waxman Act addressed a key concern that
“anticompetitive strategies . . . may delay access to generic drugs by . . . [l]imiting the availability of 30-month
stays of . . . ANDAs that are otherwise ready to be approved . . . .”).
266 See supra Letter, supra note 259, at 3; supra note 76 and accompanying text.
267 See, e.g., Sturiale, supra note 5, at 42–43.
268 See id. at 38.
269 See supra notes 4–6, 31 and accompanying text.
270 See FED. R. APP. P. 40.
271 See, e.g., Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Sebelius, 856 F. Supp. 2d 196, 201 (D.D.C. 2012); Abbreviated New
Drug Applications and 505(b)(2) Applications, 81 Fed. Reg. at 69,582 (“[T]he statutory purpose of the stay . . .
[is] to allow time for patent infringement claims to be litigated prior to approval of the potentially infringing
product[].”).

XU GALLEYSPROOFS2

2017]

4/5/2017 3:13 PM

AIA PROCEEDINGS

1047

effect of extinguishing the drug developer’s patent rights.272 There is no reason
for the thirty-month stay to continue after the appellate mandate.
Further, this proposal advances the AIA’s goal of promoting the PTAB as a
forum for challenging patent validity. Congress intended for the PTAB to serve
as a more efficient and correct surrogate for district court litigation of patent
validity.273 A goal of the AIA was to remove patent challenges from the district
courts and place them before the PTAB.274 If IPRs and PGRs are streamlined
into ANDA litigation, ANDA filers will pursue more patent challenges at the
PTAB.275
The proposal outlined in this Comment does not implicate concerns about
harming pharmaceutical research and development innovation. Some
commenters have expressed concern that IPRs “may dislodge the balanced
statutory framework underlying the [Hatch-Waxman] Act.”276 They argue that
expanding the generic industry will reduce drug developers’ ability to develop
new drugs, which will reduce the quality of healthcare in the future.277 The
proposed amendment might slightly shift the present balance in favor of
generic manufacturers, but only as a consequence of counteracting the effects
of evergreening which has priced many patients out of drugs.278 Further, the
amendment only affects patent claims that have already been invalidated by the
PTAB and Federal Circuit. Once invalidated, the patent claims no longer
provide a valid basis for blocking generic market entry.279 Removing this
unnecessary roadblock will open up the market to generic drugs.

272

See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 793 F.3d 1268, 1283–84 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Newman, J.,
dissenting) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 48, 68 (2011)) (noting that the PTAB “provid[es] quick
and cost effective alternatives to litigation”); In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 793 F.3d 1297, 1305 (Fed. Cir.
2015) (Newman, J., dissenting) (noting that the purpose of the PTAB was to “achieve rapid, efficient, and
correct resolution of issues of patent validity that heretofore required trial in the district courts”).
274 See supra note 273 and accompanying text.
275 See, e.g., Sturiale, supra note 5, at 43.
276 Kameshwari Sridhar, Inter Partes Review—A New Frontier for Hatch-Waxman Generics vs
Innovators Pharma Patent Battles 16 (Jan. 26, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=255568116; see also Shepherd, supra note 1, at 26.
277 Shepherd, supra note 1, at 7–8.
278 See supra notes 127–30 and accompanying text.
279 See supra notes 213–15 and accompanying text.
273
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CONCLUSION
AIA proceedings provide new opportunities to accelerate the FDA’s
approval of generics, and in turn, increase patient access to generic drugs. This
Comment proposes a modest change to the Hatch-Waxman statutory
framework to allow generic marketing approval once the patents blocking
generic market entry have been invalidated in an IPR or PGR. This amendment
will ensure that invalid patents do not impede patient access to generic drugs.
It also accommodates the competing policy interests of incentivizing new drug
innovation and increasing generic availability. If adopted, this proposal has the
potential to accelerate generic market entry, which will create competition,
reduce prices and increase patient access to lower-cost generic drugs.
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